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ARMED FORCES

INDOCTRINATION LECTURE ON MORALS, DISCIPLINE OUTLINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 22 Dec 82)

[Article by Col B. Orekhov: "To Indoctrinate Dedicated and Steadfast Defenders of the Motherland"]

[Text] At the conference of the Soviet Army and Navy leadership, it was pointed out that the conditions of the threat of nuclear war which hangs over mankind, we are obliged to constantly strengthen national defense and maintain the greatest vigilance. "The times now are such," said L. I. Brezhnev, "that the level of Army and Navy combat readiness should be even higher. We must be constantly and exceptionally responsibly concerned with improving combat readiness, proceeding from the growing demands. Then no accident will catch us unaware."

At the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, in discussing the draft USSR State Economic and Social Development Plan and the USSR State Budget for 1983 it was emphasized that they "as always have sufficiently considered the needs of defense. The Politburo has considered and does consider the giving of everything necessary to the Army and Navy to be an essential matter, particularly in the present international situation."

The next political study subject is "The Ways and Methods for Further Improving Military and Moral Indoctrination of the Personnel in Light of the Demands of the USSR Minister of Defense." The time for studying the subject is 6 hours: 2 hours for a lecture and 4 for a seminar. In the lecture it is advisable to examine the following questions:

1. The USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on military indoctrination under present-day conditions and the ways for further improving it.
2. The essence and areas of troop moral indoctrination.

The aim of the exercises is to remind the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] of the demands of the party, the USSR minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy on indoctrinational work, to help them more effectively form high moral-combat and military-professional qualities in the men and to prepare able defenders of our socialist motherland.

1. Military indoctrination, both in its content and its focus, is a component part of communist indoctrination and is closely tied to its other areas, including: political, moral, legal, labor, physical, aesthetic and atheistic. These are all interrelated and complement each other. However, political awareness and ideological conviction are the basis on which the qualities of a Soviet soldier are shaped. For this reason, the party, in all stages of military-organizational development, has given primary significance to the political indoctrination of the servicemen, with the main purpose being the forming of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology in the personnel.

The content of military indoctrination is determined by the military oath and regulations which set down the experience of the wars in the defense of the socialist fatherland and military-organizational development. Its basic idea is to ensure the carrying out of the constitutional duty to defend the motherland and to maintain a constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate rebuff of any aggressor. As was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, at present combat readiness cannot have a temporary or seasonal nature or remain stagnant on a certain level. It must be constantly increased and improved. The harsh reality of our days is such that each soldier and sailor, sergeant and petty officer or warrant officer should be ready ahead of time for serious testing, even today, even now.

The maintaining of high combat readiness depends upon the precise and coordinated actions by numerous categories of specialists: radio operators, technicians, operators, mechanics, sonar operators and so forth. And not only upon their ability to employ the weapons and equipment in the most complicated situation, but also upon the moral and combat qualities. V. I. Lenin taught that without an enterprising and aware soldier or sailor success in war was impossible. Consequently, the reliability of the men's combat activities is achieved both by improving their combat skills and mastery as well as by developing in them ideological conviction and moral purposefulness. Only political maturity and an inner spiritual attitude are capable in any situation of focusing the thoughts, will and feelings of the man on one goal, the complete carrying out of their duty to the motherland. For this reason, troop indoctrination is carried out continuously in the course of military and political training, alert duty and guard duty and in the daily life of the subunit and unit. It must be viewed as a system of measures carried out by a plan and aimed at forming high moral and combat qualities in the personnel.

What are the basic areas of military indoctrination?

In the first place, this is the forming of a constant readiness in the men to come to the defense of their motherland and to fight the enemy until its complete destruction as well as loyalty to the military oath and military duty. The USSR Constitution defines the defense of the socialist fatherland as a sacred duty for each Soviet citizen while military service is viewed as their honorable duty. The establishing in the servicemen's awareness of the sets which have a clear communist focus encourages, in using the words of Lenin, a "class feeling" and "revolutionary instinct" and serves as the basis of implacability for the ideology alien to us and of hate for the enemies of socialism. The warrant officers in a well reasoned and accessible manner must explain party policy and those tasks which the USSR Armed Forces are presently carried

out and they must disclose the aggressive goals and aspirations of imperialism, primarily American. It is also very important to develop in one's subordinates a feeling of personal responsibility for the defense of one's motherland and an awareness of the sacredness and inviolability of military duty.

Secondly, this is indoctrinating high discipline in subordinates. "We," said Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "should see to it that the vital position of each serviceman is determined by the conviction that the regulations and orders are a law which must be carried out by all without exception, unfailingly and unquestionably!"

What qualities mark a disciplined soldier? First of all, unquestioned obedience of commanders and superiors, a constant manifestation of efficiency, honesty and justice, the carrying out of all the requirements of the regulations and instructions and quickness in carrying out orders.

The indoctrination of discipline is a complex process. It includes persuasion, the development of proper conduct and disciplinary practices.

The method of persuasion is the basic method for indoctrinating discipline. To persuade means to influence the awareness, feelings and will of the soldier by explaining various theoretical and regulation provisions. Here success will depend upon the able selection by the warrant officers of the procedures and forms of persuasion, upon the ability to work with the men and to find the necessary means for influencing their awareness, nature and skills. This method is particularly effective when the indoctrinator instills in his subordinates a confidence in their forces and develops their positive qualities. Its effectiveness is achieved by the authority of the warrant officer since the commander's influence comprises that indoctrinational force which cannot be replaced either by textbooks, moral exhortations or by a system of punishments and commendations. The formula "do as I do" is a fail-proof means in military indoctrination.

The developing of the skills of discipline is achieved by a precise organization of troop service and by strict proper order. An analysis of practice indicates that each warrant officer can be convinced of this if he will take a close look at the combat activities of one or another troop collective and that the violation of proper order by individual men occurs because their correct views about discipline have not been firmly reinforced in daily life and that they are little exercised in proper conduct. Without sufficient training and skills, it is impossible to indoctrinate and develop the necessary habits and skills.

Disciplinary practice is a delicate pedagogical tool in the indoctrination of the men. In the subunits where commendations and reprimands are skillfully employed, as a rule, military discipline is stronger, proper order is firmer and organization is higher. Approval and praise raise the spirit of the soldier and sailor and instill confidence in his own forces. The use of punishment halts unpermitted actions, it thwarts them, it protects the collective from a bad influence and helps to strengthen order.

In all their activities related to the indoctrination of discipline in the personnel, the warrant officers should rely on the communists, the Komsomol members and the activists.

Thirdly, this is the developing of a sense of pride for belonging to the Army and Navy and the indoctrinating of the men in military traditions. At the conference held for military leaders in the Kremlin, it was emphasized that the Soviet Armed Forces are a powerful factor for peace and security and a dependable means for checking the aggressor. The high purpose of our army has also been confirmed by history. The complete defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe and Asia where our Armed Forces played the main role eliminated the fatal threat which hung over world civilization. During the most difficult days of the war, our men did not lose their confidence in victory for an instant and fought courageously and steadfastly. These examples of combat should serve as a beacon for us in indoctrinating new generations of soldiers.

Fourthly, this means the development of those moral-military and military-professional qualities which are essential for enduring the severest trials of military service and achieving victory over the enemy: decisiveness, boldness, self-possession, a readiness to help a comrade in word and deed, steadfastness and tenacity, resourcefulness and imaginativeness and so forth. V. I. Lenin pointed out that danger is a vicissitude of war. Naturally, this is reflected in the awareness of a man depending upon his ideology, combat experience, resourcefulness and inner readiness to encounter unexpected situations. Certainly in encountering the enemy face to face it is essential that the soldier be fully armed, and be able to employ not only his weapon, but also show courage, independence, tenacity, physical strength and military cleverness.

On the training fields, the driving ranges, on alert duty and on detail, in the sports facilities and in exercises, the armed defender of the Soviet Union grows mature and is tempered and precisely here are produced those moral and military qualities which ensure victory in combat. M. V. Frunze said that in training, particular attention must be paid to eliminating all phenomena which could arouse in the trainee the notion of a useless waste of his time. Training should be organized, he demanded, in such a manner that it vitally interest the trainees and arouse and develop their love for military affairs.

Fifthly, this means the indoctrination of vigilance. The warrant officers must bear in mind that high vigilance is one of the most important moral-political and military qualities. These qualities presuppose the ability to recognize the perfidious demands and actions of the enemy both in the military area and on the ideological level in order to promptly thwart these. It presupposes the ability of the serviceman to oppose any subversion by bourgeois propaganda and to decisively reject any sort of fabrications and falsehoods and provocative rumors. In its concrete manifestations, vigilance should be linked to such qualities as ideological conviction and military skill, efficiency, self-criticism, will power, responsibility, initiative and so forth. To be vigilant means to profoundly understand the real danger arising from imperialism and to strictly maintain military and state secrets.

The indoctrinating of vigilance is aided by constant supervision over the fulfillment of the requirements of the regulations as well as all measures which

disclose the great advantages of socialism, explain the military-political situation in one or another region of the world, unmask the atrocities of soldiers in the imperialist armies, the forms and methods of subversive activities by the foreign special services and intelligence and develop an immunity to bourgeois ideology and morality.

2. Morality (morals) is an aggregate of principles and standards in the conduct of people, their attitudes to one another, to society, to the family and their duties, and under army conditions, to military duty. V. I. Lenin said that communist morality is based upon the struggle for the strengthening and achieving of communism. The leader of the party demanded that every question of indoctrination, education and the training of the youth be the indoctrinating of communist morality in them and be closely tied to the daily practice of building a new life and the personal involvement in creating this.

Over the years of Soviet power in our nation a progressive and humane system of moral standards and social values has come into being and this system has no precedent in history. The morals which guide us are a fusion of wholehearted dedication to the ideas of communism and high civicness, love for the motherland and international solidarity with all peoples, intolerance of injustice and implacability for the violations of social order.

The basic principles of communist morality were formulated by the CPSU Program into the moral code of a builder of communism. This reflects all that is the finest which we have won in our struggle for social progress and it points out the ways for the further harmonious development of the individual. The basic principle in the code is loyalty to the cause of communism, love for the socialist motherland and for the socialist countries. This principle determines also the other moral standards of conduct: conscientious labor for the good of society; the concern of each for the maintaining and adding to of social wealth; a high awareness of social duty; collectivism and comradely mutual aid; moral purity. Also included in it are such principles as the friendship of Soviet peoples, fraternal solidarity with the workers of all nations and implacability for the enemies of communism.

Moral indoctrination is based upon the Marxist-Leninist teachings about morality, its role in the transforming of society as well as the theoretical provisions and practical conclusions formulated in terms of present-day conditions in the decisions of the 25th and 26th Party Congresses, in the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee on the questions of improving ideological and political indoctrination, in the materials devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and, under our conditions, in addition, in the demands of the USSR minister of defense and the instructions of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The chief criterion for assessing the moral make-up of the Soviet soldier is his dedication to the cause of communism and this is most fully disclosed in his unstinting military service and in maintaining constant combat readiness.

A profound understanding of one's patriotic and military duty, a readiness for a heroic feat for the good of one's people, affection for the commander, respect for the military collective and the military traditions, efficiency and

discipline--this is what presently determines the moral make-up of a Soviet soldier. This was convincingly outlined in the speech of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, at a meeting of the party aktiv in the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District.

Under present-day conditions, the establishing of communist morality cannot be effective without a consistent struggle against the vestiges of the past and the obvious and concealed deviations from the rules of our morality, that is, by the violating of military discipline and public order, by mismanagement, wastefulness and drunkenness. The party teaches that the struggle against such antipodes of our morality should be waged by rooting out such prerequisites as selfishness, individualism, and indifference which are often the causes of moral laxity, indifference, carelessness and disorganization. It is a task for the warrant officers to constantly and steadily introduce into the awareness of each soldier and sailor that socialism is a society not only of great concern about people, but also the greatest demands on them, on their organization and discipline, neatness and accuracy in work and that the violating of the standards of morality is viewed by us as antisocial phenomena and a decisive struggle is waged against them.

In the struggle against bourgeois ideology, the warrant officers must pay particular attention to unmasking the attempts by foreign ideologists to embellish capitalism or to defame real socialism and its successes. It is essential to clearly propagandize the achievements of the Soviet people in building communism as well as the party's concern for raising the material prosperity and cultural level of our nation's population.

The socialist competition is a powerful factor for increasing the effectiveness of all moral indoctrination in a subunit and on a ship. The assumed obligations, as a rule, have a collective nature and provide not only for reducing the times it takes to bring the crews and detachments to a state of combat readiness, an increase in the number of masters of military skills, class specialists and outstanding men, the savings of materiel, increased labor productivity and so forth, but also indoctrinational goals. The socialist competition develops a profound awareness of the social significance of military service, high responsibility for our motherland's security, thriftiness, military comradeship and mutual support and it unifies all the men of different nationalities in the course of training into smoothly functioning, well-coordinated collectives. This is carried out more successfully and achieves its goals in those instances when the competitiveness of the servicemen is an effective form for disclosing their individual abilities and a creative search, for example, in rationalization and invention work or in saving materials, ends with a concrete result and the names of the enthusiasts are widely publicized.

In summing up the results of the competition, it is also essential to consider its moral aspects, that is, the sociopolitical activeness, the moral maturity of the servicemen, their initiative, the readiness to help a comrade, the attitude toward assignments and the collective, to their duties and so forth. A formal approach to this important question does irretrievable harm both to the military-technical growth and to the indoctrinational effect on the men, as it dampens their initiative and the activeness of the personnel and reduces their

combat capabilities. Where a creative atmosphere, comradely mutual aid and great exactingness on one another reign, the indoctrinational functions of the competition gain their full embodiment.

The troop collectives possess great opportunities in the moral indoctrination of the servicemen. Precisely here the attitude toward moral values is elaborated and moral and military qualities are developed. Precisely in these collective attitudes, relationships, moods and opinions on the questions of service, training and social life are formed and combat traditions are strengthened. An all-round effect of the collective is capable of transforming a person and developing the best qualities in him. Life shows that in their majority the violators of military discipline and social order fear having to answer to their fellow servicemen who, in condemning one or another misdeed, outrightly and directly express their attitude toward achievements and shortcomings in their comrade. It is also essential to emphasize that the collectives have a great moral indoctrinational effect on the serviceman not only within the framework of service questions, but also beyond these. They strengthen the principles, standards and rules of the socialist community, family and domestic relations and they develop artistic and technical creativity. Amateur circles and sports sections instill collectivism in the men and create a firm basis for spiritual association.

This is why the warrant officers must by all means of organizational and ideological work constantly strengthen the unity of their collectives and raise their role in the moral indoctrination of the personnel and in the combating of negative phenomena. They must skillfully channel the force of the army community at increasing the feeling of responsibility on the part of each man for their deeds and actions.

In the moral indoctrination of the personnel, an exceptionally great role is played by the revolutionary and military traditions which have distilled the rich experience of the party, the people and the Armed Forces. Practical work in this area presupposes a profound study of the life and activities of V. I. Lenin, the historical experience of the party and the Soviet state, the campaign record of the Army and Navy as well as the broad propagandizing of the heroic feats of the Soviet military both during the years of the Great Patriotic War and in peacetime. However, it is essential to bear in mind that the description of combat traditions is not only a demonstration of the heroism of previous years, but also a disclosure of the vital link of today's generation with the previous ones as well as its moral and historical responsibility for the destiny of socialism and for the flourishing and security of the motherland.

The intensification and increased level of all this work can be largely aided by literature and art, the radio, press and television which help the servicemen in correctly assimilating the essence of communist ideals and the greatness of our society's moral values as well as to understand the spiritual sources of the mass heroism of the Soviet people. The patriotic greatness of the best books, films, pictures and songs about the war has a particular pertinence at present as it brings to the men the truth about the heroic feats about their fathers and grandfathers, instilling in their hearts a pride for the older generation and a readiness to defend the socialist fatherland.

In conclusion, it is essential to emphasize that the main principle in military and moral indoctrination is high party loyalty which requires a true scientificness in all indoctrinational work, its political focus and practical link with the life of the subunit and unit and with the interests of strengthening our motherland's defenses.

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ARMED FORCES

USSR SUPREME COMMAND'S ROLE IN HARBIN OPERATION LAUDED

PM081655 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 83 first edition p 2

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Prof Army General S. P. Ivanov under the rubric "Notes About Books": "Exciting Narrative"]

[Text] It was with great interest that I read the book "Breakthrough to Harbin" ("Proryv na Kharbin," Military Publishing House, 1982, 208 pages, price R1) by my combat comrade twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General A. Beloborodov. Much of what the author says is known to me as former chief of staff of the main command of Soviet troops in the Far East. At that time Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiy and I participated in the operation to rout the Japanese troops in northeast China and Korea and in the planning and leadership of it. The servicemen of the First Red Banner Army under the command of Col Gen A. Beloborodov did everything humanly possible, and probably even more, to achieve victory.

On the third day after the fighting started the army's troops captured Lishuzhen (11 August) and then, in cooperation with the 35th Army, surrounded and destroyed an enemy grouping in the region of the city of Mishan and took possession of the Mishan fortified area (12 August). Subsequently the army's troops crossed the Muling River, negotiated the (Laselin) Range and took the city of Linkou, while their foremost detachments reached the approaches to the city of Mudanjiang and took it by storm. After taking Mudanjiang, the First Red Banner Army rapidly launched an offensive on Harbin: on 20 August its foremost detachments entered the city, where they joined with the previously landed airborne units of the Second Far Eastern Front.

Even this dry list of combat deeds eloquently attests to the fact that the author had something to write about. And he coped splendidly with his task, showing all the complexity of the truly lightning preparations for the operation and its equally rapid implementation. Here the memoirs clearly reflect the foresight of the Soviet Supreme Command, which sent military leaders with great and multifaceted experience of the war against fascist Germany to lead the troops in the Far East. The combination of their experience with the knowledge of the conditions in the theater of war peculiar to veterans of the Far Eastern Front largely contributed to the successful resolution of the campaign's difficult tasks in a very short time.

Approximately 40 years have passed since then. But the book "Breakthrough to Harbin" takes me back into the past and enables us to take a broader look at the events and understand them more fully. Whereas before, when recalling the war against Japan, we spoke chiefly of its combat episodes, now questions clearly visible from afar have come to the forefront. These include, first, the multifaceted, all-embracing activity of our supreme command, the general staff, the main command of Soviet troops in the Far East and its staff, which planned and ensured the operations' implementation. This question is covered quite fully in Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiy's book and in other memoirs and military historical works. Nevertheless, A. Beloborodov adds many new details to this.

CSO: 1801/195

ARMED FORCES

TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER ON ARMED FORCES JUBILEE

PM092245 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 22 Feb 83 p 2

[Article by Army General Yu. P. Maksimov, commander of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Guarding the Southern Borders"]

[Excerpts] Our armed forces are 65 years old tomorrow, and throughout those years they have been selflessly serving the fatherland, the people and the party's cause.

The decisions of the CPSU Central Committee November (1982) Plenum and the documents of the ceremonial session to mark the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation have evoked a tremendous upsurge of political activeness among servicemen.

The scale and efficacy of socialist competition have increased. The struggle to further improve the quality and efficiency of combat and political training, organization and discipline and to improve army and navy combat readiness has become increasingly intense.

Soviet servicemen are well aware of the full extent of the responsibility placed on the armed forces and the need to constantly improve their combat readiness. That necessity is brought about by the present-day international situation: the aggressive policy of the United States and its NATO allies, which have raised the intensiveness of their military preparations to an unprecedented level is now becoming increasingly dangerous. The U.S. imperialists are building up their military presence in Europe. In an attempt to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and thereby to free its hands to gain world supremacy Washington is implementing a colossal arms race program. The U.S. military penetration of the Near and Middle East countries near the USSR's southern borders is intensifying. The forces of imperialism and reaction are waging an undeclared war against Afghanistan, which is friendly toward us.

The present situation in the world fully confirms the 26th CPSU Congress conclusion on the increase in the danger of war. The threat of war and of aggression on imperialism's part is the grim reality of our time, Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade D. F. Ustinov, USSR defense minister, stated recently at a meeting of the Moscow Military District Party Aktiv.

Under these conditions our party is doing its utmost to defend peace and stop the instigators of a new war. The entire progressive world public received with satisfaction the new Soviet initiatives and proposals on limiting the arms race and averting nuclear war put forward by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the ceremonial session to mark the USSR's 60th anniversary.

These proposals are evidence of the genuine love of peace organically inherent in our socialist state, but let no one take this for weakness on our part or try to talk to us in the language of threats and diktat. The military might of the Soviet Union and its armed forces are sufficient to defend the Soviet people's peaceful labor and socialism's gains.

Thanks to the concerns of the party and the people and the successes in the economy, science and technology in recent years all branches of the armed forces have improved qualitatively.

The Red Banner Turkestan Military District, created in the grim year of 1918, is part of the armed forces' general combat formation. In may this year we will be marking the 65th anniversary of the district's formation.

The district's forces are now fulfilling honorably the responsible tasks set by the party and government in safeguarding the motherland's southern borders, and their patriotic duty. Turkestan's servicemen are stepping up their efforts to increase combat readiness, are persistently improving military skill and the ability to fulfill combat tasks in difficult mountain and desert conditions, and are strengthening discipline and organization.

Socialist competition has been launched in all military collectives under the slogan "Increase vigilance and reliably safeguard the motherland's security."

Turkestan servicemen's military labor has been fittingly evaluated by the party and government. Many servicemen have been awarded USSR orders and medals for high indicators in combat and political training. The assistance and support we receive from the republic's working people, party and Soviet organs and social organizations are a substantial contribution to the resolution of the tasks facing the district. They do much to intensify young people's military-patriotic education and prepare them for army service, to develop patronage and to strengthen ties between labor collectives and academic institutions and military units and establishments. There is no doubt that this work will acquire an even greater scale in the name of increasing the country's defense capability.

For 65 years the Soviet armed forces have been vigilantly and firmly guarding the gains of the great October revolution. The Soviet people can be confident that the fruits of their creative labor are reliably defended.

CSO: 1801/195

ARMED FORCES

COMPLETION OF 'ISTORIYA VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY' NOTED

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Jan 83 (signed to press 24 Jan 83) p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen P.A. Zhilin, chief of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Truth About the Great Victory--The 12-Volume Scientific Work Has Been Completed"]

[Text] Lieutenant General P.A. Zhilin, chief of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy chairman of the Main Editorial Commission on the Scientific Work "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], answers questions for a special LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent.

Only two and a half years has passed since we commemorated a great historical date, the 40th anniversary of the Victory over fascist Germany and the end of World War II. That was a long time ago, but interest in the events of that period is not only not fading but, on the contrary, is rapidly growing....

Publication of the multi-volume scientific work "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," begun in the Soviet Union in 1973 and only recently completed, is one of the obvious indications of this. The twelfth and final volume was recently published.

This important, fundamental work is being published in our nation in 330,000 copies and has been successfully translated and published for several years now in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It is also disseminated through "Mezhdunarodnaya kniga" in 39 of the world's nations. Its great success is obvious.

General supervision of this enormous undertaking has been successfully performed by the Main Editorial Commission headed by its chairman, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense. The commission is made up of political and military officials and prominent scholars.

[Question] In your opinion, Pavel Andreyevich, what were the main tasks facing the Main Editorial Commission and the authors collective of this unique, multi-volume work? How do you explain the great interest it has evoked throughout the world?

[Answer] This is the first time we have produced such a work, one which makes a comprehensive study of complex military and political processes in our nation. Nor is there anything similar abroad. The enormous interest shown in our work is due primarily to the fact that World War II was the bloodiest and most devastating of all the wars human history has known. It is extremely important for everyone who strives for peace, for a restraining of the forces of aggression, militarism and revanchism to know the truth about imperialism's responsibility for the preparation and unleashing of World War II, for the untold victims and devastation.

Considering the great political importance of correctly describing the events of World War II and the need to counter the bourgeois propagandists who attempt to falsify its history and belittle the Soviet Union's role in the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism, the Main Editorial Commission saw its main task as one of creating a truly scientific "History of World War II" based on documents, on scientific methodology.

The work is designed to give the readers a more profound understanding of the complex processes involved in World War II, to help them properly assess the difficult struggle being waged by peoples against the reactionary forces of imperialism and the Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the achievement of the worldwide historical victory, and derive the necessary lessons for the struggle against the danger of war today.

The 12-volume work was created by a large collective of scholars from the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense jointly with the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, the Institute of General History and the Institute of History of the USSR under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Famous military leaders and prominent military chiefs helped prepare the work. A total of 17 members and corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 380 doctors and candidates of sciences took part in the work.

[Question] What are the most important theoretical questions raised and answered in it?

[Answer] The number is fairly large. I shall mention the most important.

First of all, the Main Editorial Commission (GRK) considered and established a scientifically based breakdown of World War II by historical periods. It thoroughly studied and resolved the complex and important question of the causes of World War II. We know that V.I. Lenin considered it essential to explain to the people the real situation, no matter how clouded in secrecy, in which a war is produced. The imperialist ideologists have made a great effort to conceal the indisputable fact that World War II was borne of the imperialist system itself, that it was prepared for purposes of destroying the Soviet State. In addition, the force directly and mainly to blame for the war, German fascism, made a great effort to distort the essence of prewar events and the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union, to divest itself at any cost of responsibility for the war which it had unleashed.

The first volumes, like the final volumes, stressed the fact that the efforts of the popular masses were the factors determining the war's development from an imperialist war into a just war of liberation on the part of states fighting the fascist coalition, that the Soviet Union's entry into the war as a result of fascist Germany's

treacherous attack on our nation was the main and crucial factor. The center of the armed conflict shifted to the Soviet-German front. Therein lies the answer to the question about the most important features of the Great Patriotic War as a national war of liberation, as an integral part of World War II, in the course of which the Soviet people and their Armed Forces accomplished the cardinal tasks. Specifically, they blocked the aggressor's path, deprived it of its main means of conducting the war and successfully pursued the armed conflict until victory was achieved.

The work thoroughly elaborates scientific concepts pertaining to the genesis of World War II, its political nature, the interdependence of policy, economics and strategy in the coalition war which World War II was, the contribution of nations to the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism, the Soviet Union's crucial role in the achievement of victory during World War II, the social nature of the Resistance Movement and the partisan struggle, and other ways in which the people took part in the struggle against fascism. The work combines the history and theory of the war in a logical process. All of these points have substantially enriched social science and established themselves firmly in scientific views.

In this multi-volume work the reader will find an explanation for a number of important problems resolved by Soviet forces in the area of the theory and practice of armed conflict. One of these has to do with the organization of a strategic defense. Despite enormous difficulties the defense maintained by Soviet forces withstood the difficult tests of the war. Even in the summer-fall campaign of 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces frustrated fascist Germany's aggressive plans, halted and exhausted powerful Wehrmacht groupings in defensive engagements and brought about the collapse of the fascist blitzkrieg strategy.

Our nation's Armed Forces then had to resolve a number of difficult problems having to do with the strategic operations involved in a counteroffensive. It is sufficient to point out the fact that the Soviet Army successfully carried out large counteroffensives in the battles at Moscow and Stalingrad and on the Kursk salient. With respect to scale and scope, results and the art involved in carrying them out, world military experience had never before seen such strategic operations as these.

Basically new kinds of strategic operations were theoretically developed and successfully employed by the Armed Forces in the form of operations by groups of fronts. We should especially stress the fact that during the strategic offensive operations Soviet forces skilfully encircled and destroyed large groupings of enemy forces. This is illustrated, for example, by the encirclement and elimination of a 330,000-man grouping of enemy troops near Stalingrad by Soviet forces 40 years ago. This was a completely new and brilliant page in the history of world wars.

The pages of the "History" also describe other aspects of the creative work performed by the Supreme High Command of our Armed Forces, which made absolutely apparent the superiority of the Soviet military organization, of our military art over the art of the bourgeois armies, especially that of the German fascist army. Consideration of this aspect of the performance by the Soviet Armed Forces is naturally also of great importance to theory and practice in the modern situation.

[Question] How is the liberation mission of the Soviet Army and Navy depicted in this work?

[Answer] An important place in our "History" is given over to explaining the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of World War II. It thoroughly demonstrates the nature of the Soviet Union's historical liberation mission. The work underscores the fact that the Soviet people's war against the German fascist invaders was a war fought in defense of socialism, a war fought for world civilization. It combined national and international interests. The Soviet Union's Patriotic War against Hitlerite Germany and its accomplices helped to unite all the world's progressive, democratic forces around the USSR.

Soviet assistance took various forms: support of the partisan movement and the creation and training of units and formations of foreign nations, which subsequently fought in battles against the Wehrmacht together with the Soviet Armed Forces. Two Polish armies, a Czechoslovak army corps, two Romanian volunteer infantry divisions, a Yugoslav infantry brigade and tank brigade and other units and formations were formed in our nation. Their combined numerical strength was more than 550,000 soldiers. The Soviet Armed Forces honorably fulfilled their great liberation mission, and the world's peoples will be eternally grateful to them.

The "History" thoroughly demonstrates the fact that for many nations liberated from fascism the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was also an important factor in their social liberation, their subsequent transition to the path of socialist development.

The reactionary historiography of the West is broadly spreading the myth about the "export" of revolutions, which, they would have us believe, the Soviet Army brought about at sword point. This is foul slander! The peoples of a number of nations actually did take a path of socialist development during and after the war. In Europe these include Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, the GDR, and in Asia, the DPRK and China. The peoples of Albania in Europe, Vietnam and Laos in Asia and Cuba in Latin America also took the socialist path of development, and everyone knows that there were no Soviet troops in those countries. On the other hand, a number of nations, including Austria, Denmark, Norway and Finland, which the Soviet Armed Forces helped to liberate, continue to be bourgeois states. Consequently, it is not a matter of the mythological "export" of revolution, but of the natural patterns of social development.

[Question] It is a well known fact that many bourgeois ideologists do everything possible to belittle the Soviet Union's historic contribution to the great victory over Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan. How is this matter explained in the new study?

[Answer] As a military historian I frequently read Soviet as well as foreign works on World War II, about which, I would say in passing, an enormous number of books, monographs, research papers and memoirs have been written. More has been written on this subject since the war than on any other.

Facts and events pertaining to the Soviet Union's participation in World War II are subjected to the greatest distortion in bourgeois literature.

Blatantly concocted slander about the Soviet Union's imaginary "complicity" in the unleashing of the war and on the falsely stated "preventive" nature of the war on the

part of Hitlerite Germany has traipsed through the pages of many such "works" for several years now. Following are a few titles of bourgeois books which definitively characterize the viewpoint of the authors of these "works": "Is the West Solely to Blame for the War?", "Was Germany Alone to Blame for World War II?" and "The Forced War."

The book "A Brief History of World War II" by retired Colonel E. Dupuy, noted American military historian, is an example of the typical approach taken by reactionary bourgeois authors to the treatment of the Soviet people's armed conflict with fascist Germany and its allies. Only three of the 33 chapters in this book deal with events on the Soviet-German front. The author did not single out for discussion a single battle won by the Soviet Army. He did, however, devote special chapters to the "battle"... for the island of Midway, to the naval engagement in the Coral Sea and other, not very important, events in which the armed forces of the USA took part. At the same time, the book's author completely ignores the important victory achieved by Soviet forces on the Kursk salient, and devotes only seven lines... to the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, one of the decisive events of the war.

The facts irrefutably show that our nation had the crucial role in the defeat of the Third Reich, however. The Soviet-German front was unequaled with respect to the duration, the scope and the fierceness of the battles fought there. It tied up the Wehrmacht's main forces and military equipment. More than three times as many forces of fascist Germany and its satellites were destroyed there as were destroyed on the other fronts!

This was not the only factor determining our nation's decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism, however. The USSR was the main moving force behind the anti-Hitlerite coalition, standard bearer of the freedom-loving peoples who united their efforts in the struggle against the fascist invasion. The Soviet Union's entry into World War II totally changed the nature of that war. The war against fascism became a great battle fought by peoples for their liberation, for social progress.

One of the persistent trends in bourgeois historiography is the attempt to conceal or present in a false light the real factors contributing to the USSR's victory, the sources of its strength. Western historians attempt to conceal that basic fact that the victory in the war was won by the socialist social and state system.

These gentlemen resort to extreme exaggeration when they write about the role of American economic assistance to the Soviet Union, however. Some authors even reach the absurd point in their "researches" of stating that without lend-lease the USSR could not have held out in the war, that our victory depended entirely upon shipments from abroad, which ostensibly "flooded in" (D. Dean, E. Ziemke, G. Infield, R. Lucas, A. Seaton, K. Howe, W. Schwabedissen, E. Erickson and others). In reality, however, lend-lease could not have had a substantial effect upon our struggle with the enemy, if only for the reason that it accounted for only around 4% of the Soviet Union's own output. The Soviet Army defeated fascism with Soviet and not foreign weapons.

In their attempt to conceal the social and economic sources of the USSR's victory, bourgeois historians move to the fore factors of second- or third-rate importance and sometimes, factors they have simply invented.

It is of great scientific and ideological importance to expose the bourgeois falsifiers. For this reason our multi-volume "History" provides a fitting rebuff for the falsifiers of every kind. It convincingly demonstrates the fact that victory over the aggressive bloc in World War II was achieved through the joint efforts of nations in the anti-fascist coalition. Their contributions to the victory varied, however. The Soviet people and their Armed Forces led by our nation's Communist Party played the crucial role in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany, militaristic Japan and their accomplices.

The Soviet Union's decisive role in the achievement of the common victory was also determined by the fact that it also gained an economic victory in single combat with fascist Germany. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union produced 102,800 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces during the period 1941-1945, while fascist Germany produced only 46,300 tanks and assault guns from 1939 to 1945. Furthermore, before the war ended the Soviet Union surpassed the USA and Great Britain in the production of tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, artillery guns and mortars. Soviet industry produced 482,200 artillery guns, 351,800 mortars and 112,100 combat aircraft during the war. The labor feat performed by the Soviet people, which merged into one with the military feats of Soviet fightingmen, assured the worldwide historic victory.

[Question] The twelfth and final volume of the "history," as we know, is devoted to the results of World War II. What can you say about these results and how, in your opinion, are they important in the contemporary international situation?

[Answer] World War II is still living history. Its results and consequences have a close linkage with the present. Our work, especially the final volume, summarizes the multifaceted experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the inspirer and organizer of the victory achieved by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, and the experience of communist and workers parties of a number of capitalist states in the development of the anti-fascist liberation struggle of their peoples.

The strength of the freedom-loving peoples is multiplied by their link with history. We know that the international situation has become substantially more complicated in recent times. The danger of war has grown through the fault of imperialism, primarily American imperialism. The Soviet people, like all progressive mankind, are concerned about the military preparations of the USA and NATO. The experience of the last war, however, and of the postwar period has shown that the plans of the aggressive imperialist circles to pressure socialism are without foundation, that the policy based on an effort to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union is hopeless.

As Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stated, "in the complex international situation, when the forces of imperialism are attempting to push peoples onto the path of hostility and military confrontation, the party and the state will unwaveringly defend our homeland's vital interests, maintain a high level of vigilance and a state of readiness to provide a devastating rebuff to any attempt at aggression."

The present seekers of world domination should not forget the lessons of the last war, its results and consequences, because history severely punishes those who ignore its enlightening conclusions. Therein lies the contemporary importance of the recently completed 12-volume work on World War II.

ARMED FORCES

PUBLICATION OF USTINOV-EDITED WWII HISTORY COMPLETED

PM081113 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 March first edition carries on page 2 a 2,000-word review by hero of socialist labor academician I. Mints of the final volume of the 12-volume "History of World War II, 1939-45" just published by Moscow Voenizdat, and edited by E Main Editorial Commission headed by politburo member and Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov.

According to Mints, the first 11 volumes narrate events of the period, while the last volume draws the conclusions to be learned from the war. In his view, the entire work is distinguished by its "strict class approach toward events and phenomena" and its "deep party evaluation, strictly scientific approach and objectivity." He goes on to stress the importance of learning lessons from the war and to maintain that the books offer convincing proof of the correctness of Lenin's teachings.

Mints speaks of the book's analysis of the importance of the national economy at times of war, the analysis of Soviet military superiority and the importance of the communist party's leadership. The review makes no mention of Stalin or the "Stavka" and does not name any other war leader.

Mints suggests that a one-volume summary of the conclusions and lessons of World War II would be welcome and that, in view of the "enormous interest not only in our country but abroad," a second edition of the entire work enriched "with new documents and materials" should be prepared.

No further processing planned.

CSO: 1801/184

GROUND FORCES

LESSON PLAN FOR 'DETACHMENT ON THE OFFENSIVE' DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 22 Dec 82) pp 8-9

[Article by Col V. Smirnov, deputy chief of the Section of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces: "A Detachment on the Offensive"]

[Text] An offensive is the basic type of combat conducted in the aims of defeating the enemy and capturing important areas (lines, objectives) in the terrain.

A detachment on the offensive is indicated the object of the attack and the direction of further advance. Usually the object of attack is the enemy in trenches or other fortification works of a strong point as well as its individually located tanks, weapons, machine guns and other firearms in the sector of the advance. The personnel of a detachment, in utilizing the results of nuclear and fire attacks against the enemy, should conduct the offensive at full strength, continuously during the day and at night, in any weather and in close interaction with the other subunits destroy the enemy on the defensive.

From the Ground Forces Field Manual

[Editor's Note] The winter combat training is in full swing. The exercises are being conducted during the day and at night and are becoming more and more complex and intense. Life has shown that the sergeants experience the greatest difficulties in training their subordinates in nighttime operations. In the article published below, the deputy chief of the section of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces, Col V. Smirnov gives the procedural recommendations and takes up certain particular features which must be considered by the sergeants in the nighttime battle drill exercises.

In the course of the combat training for a detachment, this subject, as is known, is studied in several daytime battle drill exercises. In the course of them the motorized rifle troops master the procedures and methods for dismounting and deploying into an extended line, crossing mixed minefields and attacking the forward edge of enemy defenses. For this reason, in the given exercise

APPROVED

Commander 1st Motorized Rifle Platoon,

lt Ivanov

1983

PLAN

For Conducting Battle Drill Exercise for Tactical Training
with First Detachment of 1st Motorized Rifle Platoon


Subject: No 7, Exercise 3. The detachment on the offensive.

Training goals: To achieve smooth and precise actions by detachment in night attack, to increase moral-combat qualities of personnel for actions under nighttime conditions.




Place: Section No 3 of tactical training field.

Aids: Field Manual of the Ground Forces, Part 3; Procedure for the Tactical Training of a Soldier, Detachment and Motorized Rifle Platoon. Collection of Norms for Combat Training of Ground Forces.

Material supplies: Training grenades--two per trainee; compass--1; signal flashlights--2; light markers, illumination cartridges, targets with firing simulators--according to calculation of platoon commander.

| a. Учебные вопросы и время | b. Действия командира | c. Схема действий | d. Действия обучающихся |
|---|--|--|--|
| <p>Организация занятий -- 5 мин.</p> <p>1. Выделение и разворот в цель. Уничтожение «противника» с использованием приборов ночного видения и при освещении местности -- 45 мин.</p> | <p>г. Объясняю тему, цели и учебные вопросы.</p> <p>h. Кратко ввожу в тактическую обстановку. Обучаю практическим действиям по элементам:</p> <p>1. -- выделение (в пешем порядке «по машинному») и разворот в цель в полной темноте по команде: «Отделение, на такой-то предмет -- и бою, вперед»;</p> <p>2. -- движение в атаку в темноте и уничтожение противника огнем с использованием ночных прицелов и стрельбой по вспышкам выстрелов; сосредоточение огня по одной важной цели;</p> <p>3. -- ведение огня отделением одновременно по нескольким целям при освещении местности (на чело по сигналу командира взв).</p> <p>Гренирую солдат в выполнении всех трех элементов слитно.</p> |  | <p>ж. Уясняют тему, цели и учебные вопросы.</p> <p>и. Солдаты выстраиваются в колонну по два (в соответствии с местами в ЕМП (ВТР). Выдвигаются в пешем порядке «по машинному» и по команде разворачиваются в цель. При медленном выполнении и грубых ошибках повторяют прием, двигаясь в обратном направлении.</p> <p>к. Солдаты тренируются в ориентировании при движении в цели ночью. По команде (с помощью цели) ведут огонь с ночных прицелов (на ходу) с использованием чужих прицелов и самоцели (назад). Экипаж ЕМП (ВТР) следуют за целью, выбирая наиболее удобные места для поддержки огня действий от деления.</p> <p>л. При освещении местности осветительным патроном (подсветка рассеивающим светом) в соответствии с командой ведут огонь одновременно по нескольким целям, сочетая огонь и движение.</p> |

-- continued

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|---|--|--|--|
| 2. Преодоление заграждений в атаке переднего края обороны «противник» на ночь — 45 мин. | Д Уточню, тактическую обстановку. Обучаю действиям по элементам. |  | И Солдаты перестраиваются из цепи в колонну по одному (по два) согласно боевому расчету, в головной колонне — пулеметчик. Бегом преодолевают заграждение по проходу под прикрытием огня пулеметчика и выкупа БМП (BTR). Тренируемые в обоих направлениях до быстрого и четкого выполнения. |
| Е — атака переднего края обороны и уничтожение живой силы и огневых средств «противника». | В Вызову отделение на мск. положение для выполнения норматива № 11 по тактической подготовке. В ходе выполнения отрабатываю приемы обозначения места нахождения отделения. |  | У Отделение в цепи стремительно движется к переднему краю, готовит на ходу ручные гранаты, по команде метает их с приком «ура» врывается на передний край, уничтожает «противника» огнем в упор и в рукопашном бою. |
| Разбор занятия — 5 мин. | З Напоминаю тему и цели занятия, как они достигнуты. Подвожу итоги выполнения взятых обязательств. Ставлю задачи по устранению выявленных недостатков. |  | М Отделение выходит на исходное положение, по команде обозначает свое положение установленным сигналом. |
| | Вс Командир 1-го отделения сержант Петров | | Х Выполняют норматив № 11, действуя с полным напряжением сил. |

Key: a--Training questions and time; b--Actions of commander; c--Diagram of action; d--Actions of trainees; e--Organizing of exercises--5 minutes; f--Announcement of subject, goals and training questions; g--Study the subject, goals and training questions; h--Moving up and deployment into extended line. Destruction of "enemy" using night vision instruments and illumination of terrain--45 minutes; i--Brief introduction into tactical situation. Training in practical actions by elements; j--Moving up (on foot as if mounted) and deployment into extended line in complete darkness and destruction of enemy by fire using night combat, forward"; j--Movement into attack during darkness and destruction of enemy by fire using night sights and firing in bursts; concentration of fire on one important target; k--Firing by detachment simultaneously at several targets in illuminating the terrain (start upon signal of platoon commander); l--Training soldiers to carry out all three elements smoothly; m--Soldiers form up in column by twos (in accord with their places in a BMP (BTR)). Moving up on foot as if mounted and upon command deployment into extended line. With slow execution and major mistakes, repeat the procedure moving in the reverse direction; n--Soldiers train in moving up in extended line at night. Upon command (with appearance of target) fire from short halts (on the move) using night sights and illuminating caps. Crew of BMP (BTR) follows behind extended line, choosing best places for providing fire support for detachment's action; o--In illuminating terrain with illuminating cartridge (illumination with diffuse light) in accord

--continuation

with command fire simultaneously at several targets, combining fire and movement; 2--Crossing obstacles and attack on forward edge of "enemy" defenses at night--45 minutes; p--Clarification of tactical situation. Training in actions by elements; q--Deployment of detachment into column by single file (or twos) upon command: "detachment, to passage in column by single file, at a run, march"; crossing obstacles through passage and deployment into extended line upon command: "detachment, to such an object--into battle, forward"; r--Attack on forward defensive edge and destruction of "enemy" personnel and weapons; s--Leading detachment to initial position for carrying out norm No 11 for tactical training. In course of moving up work out procedure for designating the location of detachment; t--Work on norm No 11 with detachment; u--Soldiers reform from extended line into column by single file (twos) according to allotment of battle tasks, with machine gunner at head of column. At a run they cross the obstacle through the passage under the cover of the fire of machine gunner and crew of BMP (BTR). They train in both directions until quickly and accurately performed; v--Detachment in extended line rapidly moves to forward edge, readies hand grenades while running and upon command throws them and with the cry "Hurrah" breaks into the forward line, and destroys the "enemy" by point-blank fire and hand-to-hand combat; w--The detachment returns to the initial position and upon command marks its position by the established signal; x--Performs norm No 11, in working at full strength; y--Analysis of exercise--5 minutes; z--Recalls the subject and the aims of the exercise and how they have been achieved. Sums the performing of the assumed obligations. Sets the tasks for eliminating the detected shortcomings; aa--Commander of first detachment, Sgt Petrov.

the detachment commander focuses his attention on those particular features which nighttime imposes on the advancing troops.

The effectiveness of nighttime exercises is influenced by the activity and interest of each soldier in achieving high personal indicators and by the combat mood of all the personnel. Considering this, the commanders of the forward detachments organize a socialist competition for the tasks and norms. In the given exercise the individual obligations, as a rule, include such points as: excellent orientation and the strict observance of proper direction in the detachment's movement in an extended line; the precise execution of the commands for the detachment's concentration of fire at night; the excellent execution of norm No 11 ("Attack on the Forward Edge of Enemy Defenses in Dismounted Actions"). For this norm as well as for working out the most complex procedures, the detachment challenges other detachments of the platoon to a competition, thereby raising the collective responsibility for the quality of the exercises and the productivity of the training time (just 2 hours are assigned for the exercise).

The platoon commander determines the material support for the exercise. However, the sergeants are particularly responsible for checking the proper working order of the night sights and the charging of their batteries.

In the given nighttime battle drill exercise, the infantry combat vehicles (BMP) or armored personnel carriers (BTR) are not employed and the detachment moves "dismounted as if in a vehicle." Under these conditions, the gunner and the driver of the BMP (the machine gunner and driver of the BTR) act in the extended line or somewhat behind it, that is, in the place stipulated by the field manual.

The detachment commander commences a study of the first training question (see the diagram) by briefly introducing the personnel to the tactical situation. Here is one of the possible variations: "The forward edge of the 'enemy' defenses runs at a line...(700-500 m ahead). The detachment has the task of destroying the 'enemy' in the area of...by a rush attack. The azimuth of the advance is 320° and the guide is Pvt Sidorov. Up to the line...(200 m ahead) the offensive will be made in darkness and then in illuminating the 'enemy' forward edge by rockets."

The detachment commander works through the elements (there are three of them) in the first training question separately. Upon the commands of the sergeant "Fall In By Your Vehicle" and "Detachment, To Such an Object, Form Extended Line and Forward," the men deploy into an extended line and at a quick march or run attack the "enemy." After 100-150 m, he halts the extended line and in flashing the detachment with the flashlight verifies whether the direction of the advance has been correctly maintained, whether the established places and intervals have been observed and whether the soldiers are ready to fire. In detecting shortcomings, the sergeant changes the compass course of the advance by 180° and continues to train the detachment in the reverse direction. This is done until smoothness and speed have been achieved in the actions of the soldiers.

It often happens that a sergeant becomes involved in working on the first elements and spends a great deal of time on this. As a result, the subsequent questions are made a hash of and remain little assimilated. It is not hard to avoid mistakes if the detachment commander will constantly watch the clock and most importantly promptly detect the shortcomings and their causes and skillfully and promptly give advice to those who act wrongly. It is advisable to spend around 15 minutes on each element.

The training on the next element of "moving into the attack in darkness and destroying the enemy using night sights in firing with short bursts" starts at the moment that the detachment is already deployed into an extended line upon the command "Detachment, Forward!"

As soon as the target discloses itself by bursts (the target set up in the tactical training field is operated by a man in accord with instructions received from the platoon or company commander), the sergeant gives the command to open fire to the submachine gunner (machine gunner, sniper) having a night sight on his weapon. For supervising the actions of the soldier, he should halt the detachment. However, from the viewpoint of training procedures, it would be wrong to spend too much time with one soldier while the others are idle.

In concentrating the fire of the entire detachment on a single target which is simulated by frequent bursts, the sergeant pays particular attention to maintaining the rate of advance and the precise direction of the attack. Nor does he overlook the crew of the BMP (BTR) which is obliged, in supporting the detachment's offensive, to mark the firing at the target. It should be emphasized that in working on the other elements, the detachment commander should constantly monitor the ability of the driver to select the route of movement and the stopping place (shelter) ensuring effective firing while for the gunner (machine gunner) this is his ability to select the target, the type of weapon and fire.

Undoubtedly the training of the soldiers in the procedures and methods of joint actions in complete darkness is not a simple matter, since the sergeant himself cannot always see his subordinates and assess their actions. In these instances the most effective is a procedure following the scheme: "the command and its execution and then the illuminating of the trainees and checking the fulfillment of the element." Also effective is a practice when the sergeant goes through the first training question fully, starting with the moving up and ending with the attack, right up to the approach to the obstacles.

The procedure for working out the elements of the second training question in essence is the same as in the previously conducted battle drill exercises. The detachment commander initially teaches the men to rapidly form into a column one by one (by twos), to rapidly move through the passage and again deploy into an extended line under the cover of fire by the machine gunner moving ahead and the crew of the BMP (BTR) which has taken up an advantageous position.

The the sergeant works on the rapid rush and the simultaneous reaching of the forward edge of the "enemy" defenses by the detachment and the decisive actions to destroy the surviving weapons and personnel and make certain that the assigned soldier uses the flashlight to give the established signal to designate the detachment's location.

Here one must not forget one particular feature. In darkness the locating of the training hand grenades take up a good deal of time. For this reason, the best sergeants put this element at the end of training, considering that the accuracy of throwing a grenade has previously been worked on in weapons training drills.

The working on norm No 11 for tactical training ends the exercise. This is actually a testing of how the soldiers have assimilated the training question, in what manner they perform all the elements smoothly and what is the degree of combat teamwork in the detachment.

In the analysis the sergeant without fail analyzes the actions of each soldier and points out which of the men most confidently find their way at night and skillfully operate their weapons by touch and how the individual obligations have been fulfilled. In taking up the shortcomings, the sergeant points to specific methods of eliminating them in order in subsequent exercises to show a higher level of field skills and to act at night as confidently as during the day.

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GROUND FORCES

ADVANCES IN WORLD WAR II TANK DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 22 Dec 82) p 14

[Article by Lt Gen Tank Trps (Ret) M. Fomichev, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "The Legendary Thirty-Four"]

[Text] The materials under the new heading "Weapon of Victory" which the editors are commencing upon numerous requests by readers will tell about the tanks and aircraft, the artillery systems and firearms, about the naval vessels and other equipment with which the Soviet soldiers and officers victoriously defeated the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The series is being opened by an article of the Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen Tank Trps (Ret) M. Fomichev. From the first days of the war, Mikhail Georgiyevich [Fomichev] was in the operational army. He participated in the heavy defensive battles in the Ukraine and fought at Stalingrad. The Guards Tank Brigade which he commanded liberated Lwow, it routed the enemy in Poland, it stormed Berlin and liberated Prague. In 1944 and 1945, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Much in my life is linked with the thirty-four. It would be hard to count how many nights and days I spent in this tank. It possessed many remarkable qualities: a powerful cannon, high maneuverability and dependable armor. It was not stopped either by mud, water barriers or swampy areas. Moreover, its engine could be easily started in any season.

In the summer of 1941, our unit where I was then performing the duties of deputy chief of staff, was basically armed with the T-26 tanks and there were few new KV and T-34--just six of them. At Rovno we had our baptism by fire and we made a counterthrust against the enemy which was pushing forward. The new tanks were in the first line of attack. The enemy opened fire against them, however, the front armor withstood the blows of the shells. Seeing this, the Nazis fled in panic.

For the German specialists, the appearance of the T-34 on the battlefield was a complete surprise. Here is what one of the Nazi generals wrote: "The T-34

made a sensation. This 26-ton Russian tank was armed with a 76.2-mm cannon, the shells of which pierced the armor of the German tanks from 1,500-2,000 m, while the German tanks could hit the Russian ones from a distance of no more than 500 m and only in the instance that the shells struck the side and rear armor."

The medium T-34 tank was commissioned in December 1939. It was the sole model which, having appeared even before the war, did not become obsolete and remained a first-rate vehicle during all the combat operations. The best tank of World War II was developed by designers from the Kharkhov plant under the leadership of Mikhail Il'ich Koshkin. The success was aided by the fact that the plant engineers for the first time in the world developed a special tank diesel the V-2.

In addition to the cannon, the thirty-four had two machine guns, and could pour an avalanche of lethal metal on the enemy. Here the range of direct laying with the long-barrel tank cannon and hence the effectiveness of fire was significantly greater than in foreign tanks. The thickness of the front armor did not exceed 52 mm, however, the designers had increased the strength of the hull by an optimum positioning of the armor sheets. The incorporated principle made it possible to make the hull lighter. The tank was highly mobile, its speed reached 55 km per hour and its range over highways exceeded 400 km, while in the German vehicles during the war, this figure varied from 100 to 200 km.

A merit of the T-34 was the comparative simplicity in the design of the assemblies and mechanisms. This made it possible for the crews directly under field conditions and the repair subunits to successfully perform repairs and return many vehicles to battle.

In the course of the war, the tank was repeatedly modernized: the maximum thickness of the front armor rose to 90 mm, a cast turret with a commander's cupola appeared and the capacity of the fuel tanks was increased. From the second half of 1943, the front began to receive the T-34-85 with a new 85-mm cannon developed by a group of designers under the leadership of V. G. Grabin. Regardless of the increased weight to 32 tons, the mobility of the vehicle virtually did not decline while the firepower, armor and reliability were noticeably increased. The thirty-four continued to remain a scourge both for the modernized German medium tanks such as the T-III and T-IV as well as for the new T-V ("Panther") which appeared in 1943.

The role played by the T-34 tanks during the years of the Great Patriotic War can be seen from the fact that while in 1942, their output was 51 percent of the total Soviet tank production, in 1944 this had risen up to 86 percent.

In talking about a Victory Weapon, one should emphasize that it became this in the hands of the remarkable Soviet soldiers and officers. Time and again our men engaged a "Tiger" or even a "Royal" equipped with an 88-mm long-barrel cannon and had a front armor up to 150 mm and emerged the victors from the duel. Everything depended upon the teamwork of the crew and the individual skill of the tank troops.

Precisely this is how the crew of Jr Lt Aleksandr Os'kin acted on 12 August 1944. His thirty-four was in an ambush near a ravine. Suddenly, 14 "Royal Tigers" appeared. "You cannot take such a beast head-on," correctly decided Aleksandr, "but when it turns..." Reaching the ravine, the head tank turned exposing the left side. The others followed it. The first round merely caused a flash of sparks on the turret.

"Ricochet! Fire at the tanks, on the side," commanded Os'kin. Three rounds were fired and three smokey fires burst out on the field. Without engaging the Nazis retreated in disorder. In one of the burned-out "Tigers," their developer, the designer Porsche met his unglorious end....

On the battlefields, the tanks troops, like all the Soviet military, honorably carried out their duty to the motherland. Some 250,000 men were awarded orders and medals, 1,142 became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 16 received this title twice.

By the end of the war, the T-34 had been turned into the basic type of armored equipment in the Soviet Ground Forces, having anticipated by many years the appearance in other nations of vehicles which combined the mobility of medium tanks and the firepower of heavy ones. The design of the T-34 lay at the basis of the post-war generation of Soviet tanks the T-55 and T-62.

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GROUND FORCES

BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS IN PERSONNEL MATTERS REVEALED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 22 Dec 82) p 18

[Article by Maj V. Kaushanskiy of the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District: "A 'Merry-Go-Round' of Paperwork"]

[Text] He made a phone call and having said hello, commented:

"Everything is in order. I am back in service. In the artillery school. So soon I will become a warrant officer ["praporshchik"] again.... Do you know the only thing I regret? The lost time. It should have been different..."

"It should have been different...." I remember our first meeting with WO Boris Shindzhikashvili. Tall, smart in appearance, dark complected, in a neatly pressed uniform. He and I were going through the 15 or so commendations which he had received at various times in service as a warrant officer. You could feel that he valued these commendations. And not only them. Also all that the army had provided him over the long years and that in the army ranks the warrant officer had become a party member. Possibly for this reason Shindzhikashvili responded so acutely and painfully to what happened to him. This story he wrote down on three pages of a school notebook and sent off to the editors of ZNAMENOSETS.

In March 1981, the warrant officer had completed his regular tour of duty. Not long before this, Shindzhikashvili had submitted to the unit commander a report requesting that for family reasons he be transferred to the Red Banner Tbilisi Higher Artillery Command School imeni 26 Bakinskikh komissarov. The school needed a specialist in his area. It was merely a question of drawing up the appropriate documents.

The unit commander had written on the warrant officer's report: "No reason to disapprove." A similar resolution had also to be obtained from the senior chief. And here started, in the expression of Shindzhikashvili, "the trials of fire and water." A month passed and then a second. The warrant officer's service in the unit was over. However, no one was in a rush to explain to him the measures taken under the report.

"Wait a bit, your question is being decided," his chief, Maj V. Ben'ko, assured the warrant officer.

In the meanwhile the school was wondering: "Where is the personal file and why has it not been sent out?" Shindzhikashvili asked the same question up the chain of command. He heard a reassuring answer, but his concern did not decline.

Finally, the day came when his personal file was sent off to the school and the warrant officer breathed easier. But...a paper was missing in the personal file.

"It should be written out in the unit," they told the school.

"It should be written out at the school," replied the unit commander to the completely confused Shindzhikashvili.

The warrant officer was forced to turn for advice to the district personnel bodies. They heard him out attentively and said with understanding: Have someone from the unit phone us and we will explain in detail the procedure for drawing up the documents.

Whether there was such a call, Shindzhikashvili does not know. But he was within his rights to count on a considerate attitude from the officials.

Incidentally, his main disappointment was still to come. At the unit staff Shindzhikashvili was informed that when after long misadventures his documents came to rest on the desk of Officer V. Zemlyanitsin, the latter became indignant. No, not because of the long and completely unjustified wait for Shindzhikashvili and not by the moral costs which he had paid. The anger was of a different sort. In the first place, why had the subunit commander taken the decision to transfer the warrant officer in bypassing him, the senior chief? Secondly, Shindzhikashvili had been provided with an apartment by the unit. Comrade Zemlyanitsin did not want to lose this under any circumstances. And before the very eyes of the chief of staff, Capt S. Boyko, he [Zemlyanitsin]... tore up the documents submitted for his signature.

The talk held soon after this between Shindzhikashvili and the senior chief was brief and, as they say, rather unpleasant. Its essence was as follows: if you do not give up the apartment immediately (it was against the law to deprive the warrant officer of it) there would be no question of a transfer. If you are stubborn then they would take it through all the channels.

In the meanwhile, in the unit the warrant officer was informed in no uncertain terms that it was time to bring things to an end. The term of service had long been over and either submit a report for discharge, continue serving here or ultimately obtain permission for transfer to the school. But Shindzhikashvili realized that he could not wait for a transfer and that also he did not want to continue serving here after the story which had become the talk of the town. So, he wrote out a report to be discharged into the reserves.

Incidentally, this was not the end of things. Could the warrant officer have then imagined that his report was to lie idle for almost a year? Maj V. Ben'ko showed me a curious document from which it followed that over the year four

times the documents for discharging WO Shindzhikashvili into the reserves had been forwarded to the superior staff: in February, April, May and June.

"But each time the papers were sent back," said the officer, sighing, "merely because it was incorrectly drawn up. But certainly they could have explained at once what we should have done."

Ben'ko was silent a minute, leafing through the papers on the desk in embarrassment and commented quietly:

"Of course, it didn't turn out right. Shindzhikashvili served in an exemplary manner."

Lt Col V. Krasnobay who was part of this story during our talk, in sighing, nodded his head and shrugged his shoulders. And again the familiar: "It didn't end up well." Vladimir Georgiyevich [Krasnobay] was clearly in a hurry. But, having learned that I was interested, said without beating around the bush: "It is my opinion that here the apartment played far from a minor role. Also, we are short on warrant officers and so the commander got angry. We should approach him again...."

The impression was gained that we were speaking different languages. The right and duty of a chief is to resolve questions on transferring subordinates in service and this must be done having first spoken with the man, having very carefully weighed all the "pros" and "contras" and then take a decision. Each of us must respect the human dignity of the fellow serviceman and strictly and unconditionally carry out Soviet laws governing the procedure and times for reviewing requests, complaints and reports. There is the unquestioned following of the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress that "...concrete concern for a concrete person, his needs and requests is the beginning and end point...of party policy."

Yes, in using the language of the officials involved in this story, things "did not go well" with WO Shindzhikashvili. But this glib and indifferent word in terms of the same officials should be replaced by more meaningful concepts as here there was an indifferent and irresponsible attitude toward a person. How else can one explain that for more than 15 months no one could settle one question and all this time a person was kept waiting. In an atmosphere in no way conducive to his mental equilibrium. Incidentally, the discharge of Shindzhikashvili into the reserves involved not only moral costs for him, but also material ones as he lost the benefits granted for the number of years served. And the warrant officer also has three children.

They did not allow him to forget the apartment (which he could not be deprived of), but for some reason they "forgot" to present him with the medal "For Irreproachable Service Third Degree." And before forwarding the personal file to the military commissariat they "forgot" to draw it up correctly. They obviously were in a great hurry to send the anxious comrade into the reserves as they did not correctly give the date he commenced service or the size of his family. Also for some reason, they wrote in the recommendation a sentence which did not conform to reality: "He does not wish to serve further."

Let me emphasize: does not conform to reality. In his letter to the editors there were the words: "I want to serve and in the event that I am still discharged, I will reenlist."

When I said farewell to Maj Ben'ko, I asked: What did he think, did the army need such people as Shindzhikashvili? Viktor Mikhaylovich [Benk'ko] replied without hesitating: "Certainly we do. He is an intelligent, knowledgeable specialist."

WO Shindzhikashvili is back in army service. Time will pass and his insult perhaps will wane leaving only a slight vestige of bitterness. But let the story related serve as a serious lesson for the officials who are guilty of this red tape. Sensitivity, respect and a considerate attitude toward the needs and requests of servicemen are an old tradition in our army which is reinforced by the regulations. This is a law of our life. Let no one forget this.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

MOSCOW CITY DOSAAF SETS GOALS FOR 1983

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 6 Mar 83 p 1

[Article: "The Stepped-Up Socialist Obligations of the Moscow City DOSAAF Organization for 1983"]

[Text] The DOSAAF members of Moscow were greatly pleased by the greeting of the CPSU Central Committee to the 9th All-Union Congress of the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy and the party's praise of its work to involve broad masses of people in actively strengthening the country's defense capability.

Carrying out the instructions of the 26th party congress, the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the points made in the speech by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov at the Plenum and endeavoring to mark fulfillment of the resolutions of the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress with higher indicators in mass defense, military-patriotic, training, and sports work, the Moscow City DOSAAF organization adopted the following stepped-up socialist obligations for 1983:

- develop energetic, creative work toward thoroughly and completely explaining the teachings of V. I. Lenin, the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the principles of the USSR Constitution with respect to defending the socialist Fatherland and the demands of the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and materials of the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress;
- involve an absolute majority of Society members in active participation in mass defense and military-patriotic work;
- strive for unity between military-patriotic indoctrination and the practical training of DOSAAF members in the fundamentals of military affairs and constantly raise the quality of training of pre-draft and draft-age young men for service in the USSR Armed Forces;
- together with trade union and Komsomol organizations, the Znaniye Society, and the military commissariats conduct well-organized mass defense work weeks devoted to the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces and a week of revolutionary glory in honor of the 66th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in all DOSAAF collectives;

- use preparation for important dates and events in the life of the party and the state and the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's outstanding victories in the Great Patriotic War in the military-patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of Society members;
- take part in the work of Moscow public organizations to prepare for and conduct four science-practice, scientific methods, and reader conferences for DOSAAF members, and offer 9,000 lectures by lecturers from the City DOSAAF House;
- develop and send to primary DOSAAF organizations seven lectures and six methodological aids on timely questions of military-patriotic indoctrination of Society members;
- publish four posters and four bulletins on the working experience of leading DOSAAF collectives;
- increase the ranks of the defense Society by at least 30,000 people and bring into DOSAAF all students at general educational schools who have reached the age of 14, students at vocational-technical schools, tekhnikums, and higher educational institutions;
- insure participation by primary DOSAAF organizations, especially schools, in the all-Union excursion of Komsomol members and young people to the sites of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Communist Party and Soviet people and the all-Union exploratory expedition of Komsomol members, youth, Pioneer members, and school children called "Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War";
- all primary organizations of the defense Society in the capital will campaign vigorously to make their own collectives true centers of mass defense work;
- strive for a high level of success among cadets in DOSAAF training organizations and passage of examinations by them with at least 98 percent graded "good" and "outstanding," and direct special attention to improving the practical skills of the trainees;
- train at least 47,500 persons for work in the national economy in the common technical occupations, including: 37,340 motor vehicle drivers, 1,690 motorcycle riders, 2,805 radio specialists, 2,190 maritime specialists, and 3,500 other specialists;
- bring the number of persons involved in technical and applied military types of sport in DOSAAF organizations to 850,000 and conduct 36,500 competitions;
- see that all draft-age young men being trained at training points pass the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] test;
- train 98,000 rated athletes, including 91 masters of sport and 2,525 candidates for the rank of master and 1st class athletes, and win at least 22 prizes at USSR competitions;

- sell tickets for the first and second editions of the 1983 DOSAAF lottery ahead of schedule and fulfill the plan for receiving membership dues before 22 April 1983, and before 20 December for the income part of the financial plan;
- insure trouble-free operation of machinery, strive for the highest possible technical readiness factor, prevent accidents through the fault of school and technical supervision service personnel, and observe safety precautions strictly during the use of machinery and weapons;
- set up and begin using two automatic trainer classrooms at training organizations and outfit for new motor vehicle technical servicing classrooms at the Volgograd, Krasnopresnenskiy, and Kiev motor vehicle schools;
- continue work to improve facilities at the vehicle testing areas of the Chelyuskinskaya and Testovskaya stations.
- at all schools and practical laboratories concerned with technical servicing replace the display vehicles, assemblies, and aggregates: the GAZ-66 for the GAZ-53 and the ZIL-131 for the ZIL-130;
- insure that appropriations for capital investment by the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF are incorporated up to the ceiling set in the 1983 plan, and complete the planned volume of work with good quality.

In carrying out the resolutions of the 9th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, DOSAAF members of the capital obligate themselves to raise the level of mass defense, military-patriotic, training, and sports work even higher, to strengthen labor discipline by every means, and to mark the 66th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution with new accomplishments in performance of their primary task: actively assisting to strengthen the country's defense capability and promoting the campaign to turn the Hero City of Moscow into a model communist city.

On behalf of the more than 3 million DOSAAF members in Moscow we call on all organizations of the country's Defense Society to adopt stepped-up socialist obligations for 1983, to join the campaign to carry them out ahead of schedule, and to strive for new successes in further strengthening the defensive might of our socialist land.

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DOSAAB AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF GEORGIAN SSR DOSAAF REPORTED

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 29 Dec 82 p3

[Article by Major General of Aviation Gayoz Naneyshvili, chairman, Georgia DOSAAF central committee: "A School of Courage, A School of Patriots, Marking the 5th Georgian SSR DOSAAF Congress"]

[Text] The 5th Congress of the republic Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces, which begins its work today, will be summing up the results of the performance of Georgia's DOSAAF organizations over the course of the past six years.

Georgia's DOSAAF is a mass-scale patriotic organization. Its more than ten thousand primary organizations join in their ranks almost two and one-half million members.

As a reliable assistant and reserve source for the Armed Forces, the republic DOSAAF has always considered and continues to consider as a matter of particular concern the comprehensive training of working people, particularly young workers, for military service. The Georgian defense society has concrete achievements to its credit in military-patriotic and mass defense work, training specialists for the army and the economy and in developing and improving technical and applied military sports. An expert commission checking on the training provided specialists for the Armed Forces in republic DOSAAF training organizations, for example, rated the performance of most of its schools highly. The Samtrediya, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali motor vehicle schools were among those receiving "excellent" ratings. Georgia's DOSAAF has won unionwide socialist competition for best specialist training for the USSR Armed Forces four times running. Seven republic schools now carry the "model" designation.

Analysis of the performance of DOSAAF committees and organizations in Abkhaziya, Tbilisi, Samtrediya, Makharadze, Tskhakaya, Chokhatauri, Gurdzhaani, Tsiteli-Tskaro and many other places indicates the achievement of concrete success in military-patriotic propaganda. The vast majority of the republic's rayon and city committees have begun to give more attention to an integrated approach to the accomplishment of these tasks.

Lecture series, film festivals, lessons in courage for future soldiers, mass-scale excursions and union-scale trips for Komsomol and other youth to points of military and revolutionary significance and visits to the museums on the history of the forces of the Transcaucasian Military District and the friendship of the peoples—these have everywhere been found to be conducted on a high ideological and organizational level.

Defense months and weeks, military glory evenings for new draftees, meetings with veterans of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars and troops who have won "outstanding" ratings in combat and political training and gatherings at memorials and monuments to heroes who fell in the war are all effective means of educating young people.

For success in military-patriotic activities Tbilisi's Secondary School No. 77 has been awarded Soviet War Veterans Committee certificates, Secondary Schools Nos. 37, 38 and 133 the committee's banners.

The past six years have seen improvement in the material-technical base—training facilities have been built, motor vehicle schools opened in Marneuli and Gegechkori, a KamAZ drivers school opened in Tbilisi etc.

This is making it possible for Georgia's defense society in turn to make a substantial contribution to the training of specialists in the mass-scale technical vocations for the national economy. Some 210,000 drivers for transport vehicles of all categories have been trained during the past six years. Over 30,000 motor vehicle drivers, mechanics, electricians, operators and other specialists we have trained find their way each year into working groups in enterprises, on constructions and on kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

Our technical sports clubs play an important role in training specialists in the mass-scale technical vocations having significance from the applied military point of view. Hundreds of thousands of the republic's DOSAAF members are involved in technical and applied military sports; dozens of rayon and city technical sports clubs are now in operation etc.

Trained during the period under review have been 146 USSR masters of sport and 2 internationally ranked masters of sport. Georgian DOSAAF members consistently rank in the top five of the country's best sportsmen in all-Union competition.

The Yug (South) technical sports club of the Sukhumi Physicotechnical Institute's primary DOSAAF organization has become well-known in our republic. This organization develops member skills in marksmanship and motor vehicle, motorcycle, underwater, radio and model aircraft sports. The various sections of this organization currently number more than 450 active members. Offering an extensive range of activities are the technical sports clubs of the DOSAAF primary organizations of the Georgian Polytechnical Institute, the Tbilisi Aircraft Plant imeni Dimitrov, Tbilisi Secondary Schools Nos. 66 and 161, the Natanebi village kolkhoz in Makharadzevskiy Rayon along with a number of others.

Combined flying club team activities have seen improvement since 1976. Our sportsmen have accordingly won 5th place among union republics in the multi-event parachute competitions in 1980 and 1981 and now 4th place in 1982.

In a word, DOSAAF is a school of courage, a school for patriotic education. Here our young people are tempered, here they acquire knowledge and here they are trained to become stalwart defenders of our socialist motherland.

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CSO: 1801/181

DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

ESTONIAN DOSAAF HOLDS SECOND CONGRESS

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 13 Jan 83 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Improving Military-Patriotic Indictination — The 2nd Congress of Estonian SSR DOSAAF"]

[Text] The 2nd Congress of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF was held in Tallinn on 12 January.

The assembled group enthusiastically elected the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee as an honorary presidium.

The greeting of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party to the congress, presented by P. Vasikov, chief of the department of administrative organs of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, was received with attention.

E. Pallase, chairman of the Central Committee of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF, presented the main report. He said that the time since the 1st Congress of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF was a period of further improvement in mass defense and military-patriotic work for the Central Committee, the city and rayon committees, and the primary organizations of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF. Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party and the city and rayon party committees the Society has worked in an increasingly organized manner, gained strength, and enlarged its contribution to performing national tasks. Republic DOSAAF members consider the work being done to be vital and important.

Carrying out the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the 8th Congress of USSR DOSAAF, and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee entitled "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," the Central Committee and organizations of the society adopted appropriate measures to improve their work. A great deal is being done to explain Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist fatherland, party decisions on defense issues, the principles of the USSR Constitution and USSR Law on the Universal Military Obligation, and the goals and purposes of DOSAAF. The level of indoctrination of DOSAAF members in the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces has risen. For example, the DOSAAF committees of Tallinn, Kokhtla-Yarve, and Sillamya and of Khar'yuskiy, Tartuskiy, Kokhtla-Yarveskiy, Valgaskiy, Yygevaskiy, and Vyruskiy rayons have accumulated useful experience. DOSAAF committees are working hard to achieve comprehensive solutions to the problems of

military-patriotic indoctrination of Society members. This is promoted by cooperation with trade union and Komsomol organizations, military commissariats and military units, the Estonian SSR Znaníye Society, and Civil Defense headquarters. Military-patriotic work in the primary organizations is improving. They have found successful ways to combine military-patriotic propaganda and the dissemination of military-technical knowledge.

In the last three years, with the active participation of DOSAAF organizations, more than 35,000 excursions have been conducted to the sites of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Soviet people. More than 250,000 young men and women participated in them. The materials collected significantly enhance school museums, and rooms and displays devoted to combat glory.

The city and rayon DOSAAF committees have accumulated some experience in conducting military sports camps for draft-age young men. The practice of conducting special weeks and months devoted to mass defense work continues to be refined. More than 2,000 events were held within the framework of the month devoted to the 64th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy alone.

However, the level of activity of a number of committees and primary organizations of the Society still does not always meet heightened demands. Not all primary organizations at general and vocational-technical schools have formed military-technical study groups, military-patriotic clubs, future soldier clubs, and Red Pathfinder groups. The organization of defense sports camps is not always done well. There are DOSAAF committees which are not working hard enough toward continuity and efficiency in military-patriotic indoctrination. Sometimes proper attention is not given to summarizing and studying progressive know-how.

The congress emphasized that the Central Committee of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF and the city and rayon committees must work harder toward comprehensive solutions to the problems of military-patriotic indoctrination of DOSAAF members devote greater attention to further improvement of this work in the primary organizations, and skillfully combine propaganda for the ideas of defending the homeland with broad dissemination of military-technical knowledge.

Training specialists for the army and navy is an important part of the activity of the Society. The Vyru Technical School, the Tallinn Naval School, and the Tallinn Radio Engineering School have achieved good results, for example. Training specialists in DOSAAF organizations for the army and navy is an important preparatory stage in the ~~great~~ school of life which is provided by service in the Armed Forces. The combined training posts of the Tallinn Plywood and Furniture Combine, the Pyarnu Fishing Combine, and others are examples of efficient organization and conduct of elementary military training.

Training specialists in the common technical occupations plays a large part in the work of the Society. Training organizations and technical sports clubs have trained specialists in 28 occupations.

DOSAAF has been given one more important task: insure the development of defense sports work and broad involvement of young people in it, working jointly with trade union and Komsomol organizations.

The DOSAAF organizations of Tallinn, Kokhtla-Yarve, and Sillamya, Khar'yuskiy, Raplaskiy, Vil'yandiskiy, Vyruskiy, and Pylvaskiy rayons, and the Republic Water Sports Club have good records here. More than 100,000 people in Estonia today participate in technical and applied military sports. During the report period 333 USSR masters of sports and more than 1,300 candidate USSR masters of sport were trained. The role of DOSAAF organizations in passing the standards of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] test has increased. Republic DOSAAF athletes are successfully participating in competition at different levels. During the report period they won 16 gold medals, 10 silver medals, and 6 bronze medals at the world and European championships. Vello Yunpuu and Aarne Timuska performed well as members of the USSR team in the playoff for the auto rally Friendship Cup of the Socialist Countries, while Yuri Raudsik did well in road motorcycle racing and Aadu Sikk was outstanding in motocross.

At the same time it was observed that the overall level of mass involvement in technical and applied military sports still does not entirely meet the demands of the times. The proper path here is to intensify the work of primary organizations, labor collectives, and technical study groups and technical sports clubs at the place of residence.

An important new stage in the development of defense sports work will be the 8th Spartakiad of USSR Peoples and the 11th Spartakiad for technical, military-technical, and applied military sports in the republic.

During the report period a great deal was done to improve physical facilities for training. A modern vehicle testing area was built at the Pyarnu Motor Vehicle School, new classrooms were set up at the Tallinn Naval School and Motor Vehicle School, and the Pyarnu, Tartu, and Kokhtla-Yarve motor vehicle schools, the first phase of the firing range in Myanniku was put into use, as were rifle ranges in Kokhtla-Yarve and Kingisepp, a go-cart track at the Syprus technical sports club in Khar'yuskiy Rayon, and other facilities.

Among participants in the discussion were Ye. Petrenko, chairman of the Tallinn City committee of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF; Maj Gen R. Kiudmaa, military commissar of the Estonian SSR; Ya. Saarniyt, secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Komsomol; T. Pal'm, chairman of the committee of the primary DOSAAF organization at the Saku demonstration sovkhos; S. Savi, senior Pioneer guide at a Vyru secondary school; Maj Gen (Ret) K. Aru, chairman of the Tallinn section of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans; M. Timokhina, coil winding worker at the Baltiyskaya Manufaktura Combine; P. Treyer, general director of the Talleks Production Association; and others. They shared their experience with military-patriotic work and noted the importance of excursions to the sites of revolutionary, military, and labor glory of the Soviet people (which have already become traditional), the Zarnitsa and Orlenok military sports games, competition in technical and applied military sports, competitive inspections of mass defense work, and quiz contests. The new mass movement of young people to compile a chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, begun at the initiative of the Komsomol and supported by the Defense Society, is picking up force. The people's universities of Kokhtla-Yarve, Narva, and Paydeskiy and Khar'yuskiy rayons have accumulated useful experience in military-patriotic indoctrination. It should be disseminated by all means.

The speaker said that strengthening physical facilities and using them efficiently are an essential condition for successful development of technical and applied military sports.

Speakers at the congress assured the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party that members of the Society will make every effort to continue bolstering the country's defense capability.

Lt Gen V. Zemlyannikov, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF, spoke at the congress.

The congress adopted a resolution.

Elections were held to form new groups of members for the Central Committee of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF, its auditing commission, and for delegates to the 9th Congress of USSR DOSAAF.

Participating in the work of the congress were V. Kyao, secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party; D. Visnapuu, candidate member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Komsomol; A. Gren, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, and other republic executives.

N. Bolgin, an important official of the CPSU Central Committee, also took part in the work of the congress.

At the first plenum of the new Central Committee of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF Col E. Pallase was elected chairman.

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CSO: 1801/175

DOSAAB AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

KAZAKH SSR DOSAAF HOLDS FIFTH CONGRESS

Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jan 83 p 3

[Article: "The 5th Congress of Kazakh SSR DOSAAF"]

[Text] The 5th Congress of the Republic Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy opened on 19 January in Alma-Ata at the Kazakh State Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet imeni Abay.

With great enthusiasm delegates at the congress elected the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee as an honorary presidium.

The audience gave a warm reception to the greeting of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party to the 5th Congress of the republic DOSAAF. The greeting was presented by N. A. Nazarbayev, secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

The report of the Central Committee of the Kazakh SSR DOSAAF was presented by its chairman, Maj Gen B. B. Baytasov. He told about all the work done by organizations of the republic defense Society under party leadership on military-patriotic indoctrination of the population, training specialists for the Armed Forces and the national economy, and the development of applied military types of sports. He emphasized the need for further improvement in the society's activities in light of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the November 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the 15th Congress of the Kazakh SSR Communist Party.

The auditing commission and the mandate commission gave reports. Discussion began during which the delegates took note of accomplishments and shortcomings and mentioned specific ways to improve the work of the republic DOSAAF, which is playing an important part in the national campaign to further intensify the economic and defensive might of our socialist land and in communist indoctrination of the working people.

The fighting men of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District and the Eastern Border District and the Pioneer organization sent greetings to the congress.

Participants in the work of the republic DOSAAF congress included Z. K. Kamalidenov, a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party and

chairman of the Kazakh SSR KGB; Admiral of the Fleet G. M. Yegorov, chairman of the Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF; T. G. Mukhamed-Rakhimov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic Gosplan; A. F. Shalov, chief of the Department of Administrative Organs of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party; Lt Gen V. S. Donskov, commander of troops of the Red Banner Eastern Border District; Lt Gen V. F. Arapov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Asian Military District; A. K. Zhakupov, first secretary of the Alma-Ata City Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party; and, important officials of a number of republic ministries and departments.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS OF MOLDAVIAN SSR DOSAAF REPORTED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 1 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by G. Chernomorskiy, special SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent: "Put Forth Maximum Effort, From the Moldavian DOSAAF Congress"]

[Text] Exactly six years have gone by since the last Moldavian SSR DOSAAF congress. As Major General V. Shmarov, chairman of the MSSR [Moldavian SSR] DOSAAF Central Committee, pointed out in his report, the society's ranks within the republic now number 1,839,000 members (430,000 more than in 1976) joined in 4,648 primary organizations. The period just ended has seen our defense societies strengthen their material-technical base, improve performance from the cost-accounting and production and solidify their financial positions.

The Kishinev and Tiraspol' city and Novoanenskiy and Chadyr-Lungskiy rayon organizations have turned in the best figures on mass-scale defense activity. Fulfilling plan targets and socialist obligations undertaken in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR have been primary organizations of Kishinev's Mezon and Mikro-privod plants, the sewn goods association in Tiraspol', the Production Association imeni V. I. Lenin in Bel'tsy, the Bendery silk combine, the Stol'nichey plant sovkhoz in Kotovski Rayon, Lazovski Rayon's Kolkhoz imeni Lenin and many others.

Recent years have seen the forms and methods employed in conducting military-patriotic activities become more diversified, their scope and content enriched and their effectiveness enhanced. Universities for the future soldier have been set up in each rayon.

Particular success has been achieved in training technical specialists for the Armed Forces. The Bel'tsy, Tiraspol' and Kishinev motor vehicle schools, the Kishinev consolidated technical school and a number of other training organizations have experienced instructors and a good material-technical base.

The society's technical sports clubs are training thousands of outstanding specialists for our economy. With respect to the quality of the instruction they offer and the state of their training materials, equipment and facilities, the Leovo, Nov. Aneny and Faleshty technical sports clubs approach the best motor vehicle schools.

Our technical and applied military sports, in which more than 350,000 individuals within the republic are currently involved, have enjoyed a period of further growth and improvement. The system of technical sports clubs has been expanded, and combined republic teams have begun to perform more confidently in all-Union competition.

No little has been achieved. But congress delegates concentrated their attention primarily upon problems which still await solution. It was pointed out, for example, that Lenin's teachings concerning defense of the socialist motherland and the requirements of the universal military service law are still not being publicized with the requisite thoroughness nor these presentations given the proper orientation. Substantial groups in the population are still not being included in military-patriotic activities. Primary organizations are giving inadequate attention to the development of individual society members.

Due to poor organizational efforts on the part of the Chimishliyskiy, Komratskiy, Kutuzovskiy and a number of other DOSAAF rayon committees, there still remain no small number of primary organizations whose entire activity consists simply in collecting membership dues and distributing lottery tickets.

Both the report and the discussions pointed to deficiencies in the training being provided specialists for the Armed Forces. Trainees in a number of training organizations are not developing proper equipment maintenance skills, particularly under field conditions. Still to be met with is the harmful practice of letting routine daytime excursions through town or over one rayon road or another substitute for complex drills. All this is the result of inadequate exactingness on the part of training organization leaders and of low levels of political education work with both temporary and permanent staff. And then rather than exercising its authority, the MSSR DOSAAF central committee occasionally limits itself to admonitions and exhortation alone.

The congress also drew attention to shortcomings in the training provided specialists for the economy. Driver training provided by the Leninskiy (Kishinev), Kalarashskiy, Kotovskiy and Komratskiy technical sports clubs, for example, is not measuring up to present-day requirements. Motor vehicle maintenance services are poorly organized in the Kagul'skiy and Sovetskiy (Kishinev) technical sports clubs. Accident prevention and labor safety rules are being violated.

There are also shortcomings to be noted in the development of technical and applied military sports as well as in other areas of DOSAAF work.

N. Wladov, chairman of the republic DOSAAF organization's auditing commission, presented a detailed report. He reported to congress delegates on how money and materials were being used as well as on progress in construction. The auditing commission's report devoted a great of attention to the need to improve procedures associated with the operation and maintenance of motor vehicles, to conserve fuel and to tighten financial discipline.

Now if we do take 1976 as a point of reference, we will of course see a certain improvement in any area of DOSAAF work. ~~The~~ fact is, though, that in socialist competition among defense organizations of the various union republics Moldavia's DOSAAF members remain ranked somewhere around the middle. Not only were they to be found in fifth place on the winners' chart on the basis of the results of last year's competition, they have now dropped to seventh place. How are we to account for this?

The primary reason for this failure to achieve any progress, Colonel General A. Odintsov, first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF central committee, stressed in a speech to the congress, has been an inability to focus attention on the most important problems. Why is it, indeed, that next to outstanding schools, which with respect to the

condition of their material-technical base are in no way inferior to the best training organizations in the country, are to be found schools which are still lagging behind? And there is no small number of schools like this to boot. Suffice it to say that more than half of the schools inspected this year received only a "satisfactory" rating. Is this possibly because the experience accumulated by the leading schools remains, as we say, a closed book, to them? Hardly. It's but a stone's throw from one school to another. You can always drop in on your neighbors to see what good ideas they've had. The republic's DOSAAF House has also done no little in the way of publicizing practical experience the leading organizations have gained. The posters and leaflets it puts out show the specific steps to take on the road to success. Unfortunately, however, it simply hasn't gotten to the point of actually adopting the leaders' practical innovations.

We see a similar picture when it comes to training specialists for our economy. It cannot be said that Moldavia's DOSAAF central committee has not dealt with these problems. The decisions it has made haven't been all that far off the mark. But the problem lies in the fact that the organization behind the implementation of these decisions, the discipline involved in the execution, has not always been good.

Also speaking at the congress were M. D'yaura, chief, administrative organs department, central committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia; M. Orlova, secretary, Moldavian council of trade unions; Lieutenant General L. Gorelov, deputy commander, Red Banner Odessa Military District and I. Buzhenitsa, secretary, Moldavian Komsomol central committee.

In its greeting to the congress, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia undertook its evaluation of the republic defense organization's performance and declared itself confident that its deficiencies would be remedied and new successes achieved.

V. Vysku, deputy chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers, also participated in the the work of the congress.

Major General V. Shmarov was elected chairman of the Moldavian DOSAAF central committee at the organization plenum.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

ACTIVITIES OF ARMENIAN SSR DOSAAF CONGRESS REPORTED

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 9 Jan 83 p 2

[Article by M. Nemirova, special SOVETSKIY PATRIOT correspondent: "Cadres—the Critical Link, Reports and Elections Under Way"]

[Text] Three hundred forty-three delegates, representatives of Armenia's million and a half-strong defense organization, have gathered in the assembly hall of the republic DOSAAF central committee building for their regular congress. The period under review has seen success achieved in military-patriotic, mass defense, training and sports activities. Plans for training specialists for the armed forces and the economy have been fulfilled.

A strong material training and sports base has been created within the republic. DOSAAF training organizations, the Yerevan flying club, three city gun clubs, 43 rayon and city technical sports clubs and more than 100 firing ranges have been accommodated in new or thoroughly renovated facilities.

Thanks to the defense society's extensive network of training organizations and sports facilities and their modern equipment it has been possible substantially to improve the quality of the training provided to specialists and to accommodate more people in its technical and applied military sports programs. The period under review has seen Armenia train more than 600,000 rated sportsmen.

The congress report, delivered by Major General I. Bagramyan, chairman of the republic DOSAAF central committee, dealt with questions connected with the republic defense organization's many different activities, the successes it has achieved, ways to remedy deficiencies by aggressive exploitation of all available resources and tasks now on the organization's agenda in light of requirements imposed by the 26th CPSU Congress and the May and November (1982) party central committee plenums. He focused attention upon military-patriotic education for workers, particularly young people, and pointed out that the organization has taken concrete steps in implementation of the CPSU Central Committee decree, "Improving Ideological and Political Education." Many committees have now accumulated practical experience with an integrated approach to military-patriotic education, in consequence of which this activity is now better planned and organized and more effectively oriented. The reporting and election campaign preceding the congress, in the course of which more than 27,000 persons spoke at meetings and conferences, has contributed in a substantial way to favorable solution of this problem.

Committees in Yerevan city and Nairiyskiy, Masisskiy and other rayons as well as the Oktember'yanskiy Rayon DOSAAF organization, initiator of unionwide socialist competition to mark the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, are successfully resolving problems associated with the conduct of military-patriotic education for our workers. This has been the result of concrete guidance on the part of local party and soviet organs, effectively planned activities and skillful utilization of all effective forms and means of agitation and communication.

The performance of the leadership of the Shamshadinskiy, Krasnosel'skiy, Gukasyanskiy, Aparanskiy and Stepanavanskiy rayon committees, the ideological-political level and content of whose military-patriotic work was found to be at a low level, was also subjected to serious criticism.

Many of the primary organizations in these rayons are not really engaged in effective activities. They have no training-material base and have set up no technical military groups or sports sections. The rayon committees are not looking into the activities of their lower-level defense organizations, while the Armenian DOSAAF central committee department responsible for mass-scale organizational activities and military-patriotic education has limited itself to general instructions only.

Acting delegates speaking with reference to the DOSAAF central committee and auditing commission reports were A. Baybutyan and D. Gukasyan, chairmen of the Leninakan city and Oktember'yanskiy rayon committees; M. Stepanyan, director of the Yerevan consolidated technical school and V. Kazaryan, primary organization chairman, Nairit scientific-production association. They shared their practical experience, pointed out the causes of deficiencies and offered specific suggestions for improving the modus operandi of republic DOSAAF central committee departments and invigorating the activities of republic and rayon auditing commissions.

A speech by congress delegate Z. Simonyan, world champion and honored master of sport, reflected a particular concern. Disturbed by how poorly developed marksmanship has been among women, she found the solution of the problem to lie in equipping firing ranges such that they measure up to present-day requirements.

H. Voskanyan, secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, extended a warm greeting to the congress and expressed his wish for continued success in mass defense, training and sports activities.

Also speaking at the congress was Colonel General A. Odintsov, first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF central committee. He congratulated the members of the republic's defense organization on their victory in unionwide socialist competition marking the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and presented the challenge pennant of the AUCCTU, the Komsomol central committee and the USSR DOSAAF central committee and the USSR DOSAAF central committee's red challenge banner for specialist training for the USSR Armed Forces.

Participating in the work of the congress as well were R. Svetlova, deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR council of ministers; G. Akopyan, secretary of the republic trade union council; M. Davtvan, chief, administrative organs department of the Armenian Communist Party central committee; Major General A. Kazaryan, republic military commissar, and Major General of Aviation G. Naneyshvili, chairman of the Georgian SSR DOSAAF central committee.

Major General I. Bagramyan was elected chairman of the Armenian SSR DOSAAF central committee at the organization plenum.

DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

SHORTCOMINGS CITED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF DOSAAF DRIVER EDUCATION PROGRAM

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 25 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by K. Shestopalov, senior inspector, Central Committee of USSR DOSAAF: "The Main Thing Is Efficiency"]

[Text] No one today doubts the usefulness of auto trainers used in the training process to train drivers of categories "V" and "S" vehicles.

But despite the fact that training using trainers has been done on DOSAAF organizations for more than 10 years now and series production of auto trainers has been organized, we still have not been able to insure that they are used in a planned and efficient manner at all DOSAAF schools and technical control services.

At many organizations which have trainers training on them is still not mandatory and often is not done to the full extent envisioned by the program. They fail to observe the basic principle of unity of training on the trainer and in the motor vehicle, and there is a lack of logical succession in moving from the trainer to the training vehicle. Therefore, the effectiveness of use of auto trainers is sharply reduced.

The main reasons for this situation are the low reliability of trainer designs (which results in them being down for long times because of various malfunctions), discrepancies between the design of the trainer and the parameters of the base model of motor vehicle being simulated, and imperfections that still exist in the methodology of teaching driving on an auto trainer.

The design and technological shortcomings that have been identified have not been eliminated by the manufacturing plants over the course of several years, and the AT-01 auto trainer continues to be produced with the very same defects up to the present time. There is no need to list these defects again, because specialists are very familiar with them. The problem now is to make the auto trainers available at the local sites serviceable as quickly as possible by supplying all necessary spare parts and keeping them that way until the depreciation period has run. In our opinion more AT-01 auto trainers should not be produced.

The design of the trainer should insure simplicity (and as a consequence, low cost), good operating reliability, correspondence of all parameters to the vehicle model being simulated, and performance of all vehicle control techniques.

The presently used organization and methodology for teaching driving, where two different masters teach the same course, cannot completely insure meeting the main condition: unity and succession of training on the trainer and in the motor vehicle. Each of the masters works independently, without essential interaction. In many cases this leads to a situation where masters of production training in vehicle driving repeat training in certain control techniques or sometimes simply begin training from "zero," disregarding the skills received from the trainer.

All this ultimately reduces the use efficiency of the trainer and impairs the training of vehicle drivers. It appears that the time has come to solve this problem gradually by introducing new, more progressive organization of training where each master teaches the cadets assigned to him entirely on the auto trainer at first, and then in the vehicle (continuous training).

This also calls for working out a new methodology. It is useful to alternate trainer training with training in the vehicle for certain exercises. This unquestionably has a positive effect in acquiring more solid vehicle control skills.

With the new organization of driver training, of course, we will need more masters who possess the skills necessary to teach with auto trainers.

Two all-Union training methods assemblies on training masters of trainer education and raising their qualifications were held in 1980 and 1982. About 500 people received thorough education in the design of the trainers, technical servicing, identifying and eliminating problems, and repairing them.

Many DOSAAF committees today have adequately qualified masters in the local areas. And the committees themselves are capable of organizing the training of masters with their own personnel. The administration of cost accounting personnel training for the national economy of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is working out a special program which will be ratified and delivered to the DOSAAF committees in the first quarter of 1983.

Positive solutions to all of these problems will make it possible to reduce economic costs significantly and to improve the quality of training for driver personnel in DOSAAF organizations.

11,176

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

SOVIET VIEWS ON ISRAEL'S PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE CBOZRENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 (signed to press 10 Nov 82) pp 46-49

[Article by Col. I Moronov: "The Israeli Pilotless Aircraft"]

[Text] As the result of Tel Aviv's naked aggression supported and directed by American imperialist circles, the Israeli military has turned the long-suffering land of Lebanon into a bloody training ground where barbaric weapons have been used against the Palestinians and Lebanese with monstrous cruelty and new models of combat equipment developed by the Israelis have been tested. The foreign press includes the Scout and Mastiff multipurpose pilotless aircraft among these new types of equipment.

The Scout airplane was built by the Israel Aircraft Industries Company. It is a monoplane with a high-set straight wing and a double-fin tail unit mounted on two beams (see Figure 1 [not reproduced]). The skin of the fuselage is made of aluminum alloy while the wing, fins, and beams are fiberglass. According to statements by company specialists this has made it possible to greatly reduce the effective reflecting surface of the pilotless aircraft. The Scout has a two-cylinder piston engine with a two-bladed pusher propeller which works on a 20:1 mixture of gasoline and oil. The engine has 18 horsepower.

The aircraft is launched by a pneumatic catapult (the launcher guide is 15.2 meters long and air pressure in the working cylinder is 5.2 kilograms per square meter) mounted on a truck (see Figure 2 [not reproduced]) or from the ground. In the latter case a simple three-strut undercarriage is installed on the aircraft. After performance of its flight mission the Scout is brought to the landing region by radio commands from a ground control post. There at the end of the descent glide path it is caught in the air by a special net. Then the plane is removed from the net and prepared for its next takeoff.

The Western press notes that various kinds of reconnaissance equipment can be installed on the pilotless aircraft, including a television camera, a panoramic aerial camera, and also a laser rangefinder-target indicator. It is reported specifically that the television camera (the basic type of onboard

equipment) is stabilized by pitch and yaw angles with a precision of 100 micro-rads and is capable of scanning the land surface within a 360 degree range on the azimuth and up to 90 degrees by elevation angle and of transmitting the television image to a ground control post with a scan of 625 lines and a frame frequency of 25 hertz. The camera weighs 13.6 kilograms and has a lens with a variable focusing distance (dynamic limits of change in it are 1:15) and a field of vision from 3.4×2.5 degrees to 47.5×36.5 degrees. The full time required to change the focusing distance is two seconds.

The flight of the Scout aircraft is remote controlled from the ground post. The control post is housed in a container mounted on a truck body. Two antennas are mounted on the rear part of the container, one for radar tracking and transmission of the control commands to the pilotless aircraft and the other a receiving antenna for reconnaissance data transmitted from the aircraft. There is an air conditioner set above the cab of the truck, while inside the container are the flight control equipment and the work positions of the control post personnel (see Figure 3 [not reproduced]). The team has seven members including the commanding officer, an operator, a navigator, an observer, and technical servicing personnel.

The job of the operator (the foreign press calls him the "pilot") is to monitor the elevation, speed, and course of the pilotless aircraft's flight and to issue appropriate commands. The Scout is capable of flying according to a program, using the autopilot or by manual control. The onboard autopilot takes over control functions during loitering, but at the same time the operator can change the bank angle. The programmed route is fed to the autopilot before the aircraft takes off or during the flight.

The aircraft is capable of automatically returning to the landing region. This is accomplished as follows. If the command transmission line is interrupted for 2-3 seconds the aircraft performs an ascent (established in advance) and begins to loiter. If communication is not restored in 4-5 minutes the Scout automatically heads toward the landing region whose coordinates are continuously refined during the flight. In the assigned region the aircraft loiters while descending, awaiting further commands.

At his work position the navigator has a mapboard which shows the route of the plane's flight. A map with a scale of 1:12,500 is used for the segment of cruising flight and a map of smaller scale is used for the loitering regions (conducting reconnaissance).

The observer (who may be an artillery observer or forward air controller) controls the onboard reconnaissance television apparatus. The images transmitted are displayed on a 35-centimeter television screen and record on video tape for detailed analysis later. Alphanumeric information is recorded along with the videorecording, including such data as the coordinates of the target being scouted, flight elevation above sea level and above the target, the angle of elevation and course angle of the camera, its field of vision, and the date and time of the survey.

The foreign press notes that a standard subdivision of pilotless Scout aircraft consists of 4-6 planes, mobile ground control posts, and a launcher. Such a subunit has 12 personnel.

The Mastiff aircraft was built by the Tadiran Company in two modifications, the Mk1 and Mk2.

The Mastiff Mk1 is a monoplane with a high-set straight wing and a single-fin tail unit (see Figure 4 [not reproduced]). The glider is built of fiberglass. Its power plant is a 10-horsepower two-cylinder piston engine. Onboard reconnaissance equipment is a miniature television camera or a panoramic aerial photography camera. The plane's flight is controlled by radio command from a ground post. The plane can be employed from small, unprepared areas (its takeoff run is 150 meters and the landing run is 60-80 meters).

The Mastiff Mk2 is a monoplane with a high-set straight wing and single-fin tail unit mounted on two beams (see Figure 5 [not reproduced]). It has a 14-horsepower two-cylinder piston engine with a two-bladed pusher propeller and carries 22.7 liters of fuel.

The plane takes off from a ground launcher by means of pneumatic catapult; for landing an extendable hook which catches the cable of the arresting gear is used. Flight control is done by radio commands from the ground post.

Judging by reports in the foreign press various kinds of equipment can be installed on the pilotless aircraft (including a reconnaissance television camera, aerial photography camera, infrared forward scanning set, laser range-finder-target indicator, and electronic countermeasures equipment). The plane performs various functions depending on its set of equipment. In addition the plane can be used as a dummy target (in this case it is equipped with passive radar reflectors that simulate a full-size aircraft) or as an attack weapon, carrying a charge of explosives on board.

The table below, compiled from material in the foreign press, shows the chief tactical and technical characteristics of the above-discussed pilotless aircraft.

The Western press observes that for a long time before the aggression the Israeli command used these aircraft for aerial reconnaissance of Lebanese territory. But with the onset of military operations the sphere of their application expanded greatly. Thus, according to reports in the American journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, the use of pilotless scout planes enabled commanders at all levels in the Israeli army to receive a realistic picture of combat operations underway at a particular moment and to coordinate the attacks of their air and ground forces.

According to the testimony of this journal, forward air controllers using Scout aircraft guided assault planes (fighter bombers and ground-attack planes) to individually selected targets in order to destroy them from the air and then evaluated the results of the strikes and the loss caused. Some of the pilotless aircraft equipped with laser rangefinder-target indicators to illuminate targets with a laser beam supported the use of controlled weapons with laser guidance systems. Furthermore, the pilotless aircraft equipped with electronic countermeasures apparatus were employed for electronic suppression of emitting

Primary Tactical-Technical Characteristics of Israeli Pilotless Aircraft

| Characteristics | Scout | Mastiff-Mk1 | Mastiff-Mk2 |
|--|-------|-------------|---------------|
| Takeoff Weight, kilograms | 118 | 70 | 75 |
| Weight of Payload, kilograms | 22.7 | up to 15 | 15 |
| Weight of Fuel, kilograms | 14.5 | - | - |
| Maximum Flying Speed, kilometers/hour | 148 | 148 | 130 |
| Cruising Speed, kilometers/hour | 102 | 74-110 | 74-110 |
| Rate of Climb from Ground, meters/second | 2.5 | - | more than 2.5 |
| Practical Ceiling, meters/second | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Operating Radius, kilometers | 100 | - | 70 |
| Maximum Flying Time, hours | 4.5 | 4 | 3-4 |
| Dimensions, meters: | | | |
| Length | 3.68 | - | 2.6 |
| Height | 0.94 | - | 1.0 |
| Wingspan | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| Wing Area, square meters | - | - | 2.0 |

equipment on Lebanese territory, and they were often employed as dummy targets to foul up their work.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENT ON DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S., NATO MILITARY POLICIES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 16 Dec 82) pp 19-26

[Article by Col I. Belov: "NATO: By a Course of Confrontation and Adventurism"]

[Text] The world situation which has grown sharply more complex in recent years has caused great concern, profound alarm and fear among all honest people in the world. In international relations, one can clearly trace two diametrically opposite courses: the first which is the line of the USSR, the other socialist states and all peace-loving forces of strengthening peace and establishing peaceful coexistence among states with different sociopolitical systems; the second is the policy of the imperialist countries headed by the United States of exacerbating the international situation and preparing for a nuclear war.

In recent years, the aggressive forces of imperialism have developed a campaign against detente. In flagrantly violating the letter and spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, they have in every possible way increased international tension, accelerated the arms race and have attempted to carry out a policy "from a position of strength" and restore the "Cold War." "Adventurism and a readiness to wager the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their own narrow, selfish interests," as was pointed out in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, "this is what is particularly apparent in the policy of the most aggressive circles of imperialism."

The basic role in the aggressive plans of imperialism has been assigned to the main military-political grouping of the capitalist nations, the NATO bloc, which in the eyes of the peoples is a source of military danger and a support for all the reactionary forces of Europe. Its existence and activities complicate and impede the resolving of urgent world problems and the development of cooperation between peoples and create an atmosphere of international tension. The activities of this block have assumed particularly dangerous traits in recent years. At present, the U.S. Administration and primarily President Reagan as well as the NATO leadership (we would point out that its secretary general is Luns, a man with a dubious past who in the 1930's was closely linked to fascism) play the unenviable and despicable role of "crusaders" and instigators of a new war.

Along the path of confrontation and adventurism. The military programs and doctrines of the United States and the other basic countries of the bloc proceed from the admissibility of a nuclear war. The achieving of military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact is overtly proclaimed as the aim of the policy of the leading U.S. and NATO circles. Washington unceremoniously intervenes into the affairs of other states, it employs the methods of pressure and the dictating of terms and endeavors to suppress the legitimate aspiration of the peoples for freedom and social progress. The growth of militarism and hegemonistic aspirations as well as the adventuristic policy of the United States and NATO threaten universal peace. Recent events show that the aggressive forces of imperialism, primarily American, are endeavoring to force international relations from the path of detente to the path of confrontation and brinkmanship and are resorting to direct threats of the use of force, even up to nuclear weapons.

In the aim of achieving military superiority, new programs, doctrines, strategies and concepts are being worked out. The new American military strategy of "direct confrontation" is aimed precisely at "achieving complete and indisputable military superiority over the USSR" and at an ubiquitous confrontation with it.

Of particular danger is the decision taken by the NATO leadership under U.S. pressure to "arm-up" the bloc with new American medium-range missiles and to deploy these in Western Europe in order to turn it into a launching area for American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, into the site of a "limited" and "extended" nuclear war and into a nuclear hostage of the American provocateurs who are endeavoring to deflect the retaliatory nuclear strike from the United States and direct it against its European partners. These new missiles which are to begin being deployed in 1983 and aimed at the USSR, in being first-strike weapons, threaten the entire European continent and this creates a serious danger for Europe and the world as never before. The Western European press not without some sarcasm has written about this: "The salvation of Europe is guaranteed at a price of its complete destruction."

The aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction are against everything that does not conform to their militaristic plans and reject, as they say, out of hand all Soviet proposals aimed at reducing the military confrontation, particularly in Europe. They are waging an overtly hostile policy against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

The U.S. and NATO leaders, in using the concocted myth about the "Soviet military threat," have overtly proclaimed a policy of strengthening the arms race and conducting policy "from a position of strength." Militaristic statements are constantly being issued from Washington. There it has been officially announced that the American administration will "spend whatever is required to increase the military might of America and obtain advantages over the Soviet Union."

During a trip to Western Europe in June 1982, President Reagan in the course of his speech in the House of Parliament, in endeavoring to resurrect the ideas of a "crusade" against the USSR and the other socialist nations, directly urged

his NATO allies: "Let us stop vacillating, let us use our might." Such outright militaristic appeals from an official on such a level have not been heard by Western Europe since the incendiary speech by Churchill in Fulton in 1946. In his speech in the FRG Bundestag, Reagan, as was pointed out by the West German press, actually urged "arm, arm and again arm." In one of his militaristic speeches he stated: "We are not bothered if someone does not like us. We will enforce respect."

The American leaders who so irresponsibly proclaim the use of force in international relations determine the policy not only of the United States but also of the entire NATO bloc. The aim of such policy has been disclosed with maximum clarity in a publicized Pentagon directive: "The destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." In his introductory speech at a session of the NATO Council (in 1982), the NATO Secretary General Luns urged for talks with the Soviet Union solely "from a position of strength."

On the same day that the Soviet Union announced its obligation not to employ nuclear weapons first, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Joint NATO Armed Forces in Europe, the American General Rogers, publically recommended that the United States and NATO adopt a concept of making the nuclear strike first. Are not such statements irresponsible and clearly provocative? Certainly this general holds one of the highest posts in NATO.

In recent years, all the sessions of the NATO Council have been held in an atmosphere of appeals to further increase the bloc's military potential and to conduct talks "from a position of strength." The June 1982 session was no exception and this was held on the level of the heads of state and governments of the member nations. Here the American president provocatively urged his partners not to forget that the West in the political sense "continues to remain in a state of war with the Soviet Union."

In assessing the foreign political course of Washington, we must not forget the fact that adventurism has always been inherent to the United States. The Western press has pointed out that over the 200 years of its existence, the United States has made over 200 armed aggressions against other nations. According to the data of the American Brookings Institute, from 1946 through 1975, America used or threatened to use armed forces in support of its foreign policy actions some 215 times and resorted to threatening the use of nuclear weapons 33 times. Sinister figures.

The naked anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, the course of confrontation with the USSR and the adventuristic actions by the U.S. and NATO leadership undoubtedly cause a heightened military danger and lead to a significant rise in international tension, a disruption of stability in many regions, the maintaining of centers of military conflicts and to a threat to world peace.

The material preparations for a new world war are being carried out by NATO in all areas.

For the bloc's member nations, recently there has been an unprecedented growth of military expenditures. History knows no examples when such enormous amounts

have been spent in peacetime for military purposes. Here, of course, the tone is set by the American militarists and under their pressure in 1978, NATO adopted a resolution to annually increase military expenditures by 3 percent in real terms. Now Washington is demanding that this be brought up to 4 and even 5-7 percent.

Actually the NATO countries are increasing their military budgets in real terms in significantly greater amounts each year. For example, in the United States, military outlays in recent years have increased by 15-17 percent a year, in Great Britain by 14-27 percent, in Italy by 20-25 percent, in France by 17-18 percent, while in Turkey this indicator has reached 70-75 percent. Of course, a certain share of this increase has been due to inflation, but the real growth remains very high.

How much money is spent for military purposes in the bloc's nations? In 1979, the figure was 212 billion dollars, 256 billion in 1980 and 272 billion in 1981. In 1982, these expenditures will obviously far surpass 300 billion dollars, since the United States alone increased military allocations by almost 40 billion dollars.

The share of the NATO nations in the military expenditures of the entire world, as the foreign press indicates, is now at least 60 percent of which one-half is due to our time's most aggressive state, the United States. Here is the shameful leadership of the West's militarists which cannot help but cause fear and alarm among all peace-loving peoples.

In the coming decade, the American Administration intends to allocate up to 1.7 trillion dollars for military purposes. However, foreign specialists feel that the carrying out of the designated programs in these years will require additional allocations totaling at least 750 billion dollars. Undoubtedly the American imperialists are endeavoring to force other states in the bloc to follow this course.

As a total during the existence of NATO (1949-1982), its members have spent over 3.5 trillion dollars on military purposes. Where have these enormous amounts of money gone?

A significant portion of them has gone to an unrestrained increase of the arms race. Of course, many expenditures have gone to maintain the large armed forces of the bloc's states which now number around 5 million men.

The amounts allocated by the NATO nations to purchase weapons are around 20 percent of the total expenditures. The highest share is in the United States. In 1982, this was 30 percent and for 1983 35 percent is planned. The annual increase in these funds for the Pentagon alone is 35-40 percent, and over the last 5 years (up to 1983) these have increased by 3-fold. In the United States, in 1981 around 48 billion dollars were allocated to purchase weapons and military equipment, in 1982 the figure was 65 billion and for 1983 90 billion are planned. The same thing is occurring in financing weapons development: while in 1981, up to 17 billion dollars were made available just through the Defense Department, for 1983 the figure was already over 24 billion. Over the last 5 years, allocations for these purposes have doubled.

The same trend can be noted in many other nations of the bloc. For example, in Great Britain, for the purchasing of weapons in the 1982-1983 fiscal year, up to 6 billion pounds sterling were allocated from the budget of the Ministry of Defense, that is, 23 percent more than in 1981-1982. Expenditures on research and development in 1981-1982 were around 1.8 billion pounds. In France the analogous expenditures increase annually by 18-25 percent and in the FRG by 7-8 percent.

As we can see, the facts speak for themselves: in NATO enormous amounts are being spent on the arms race and there is an on-going tendency for their annual more than significant increase.

What weapons are being purchased with these funds? In the basic NATO nations, primarily in the United States, priority in the development and purchase of weapons has been given to weapons of mass destruction, to nuclear and chemical weapons. From this it becomes clear just what the rhetoric about the defensive nature of NATO is worth.

In actuality, nuclear weapons and primarily those of strategic importance are at the center of attention for the ruling circles of the member nations. The United States, Great Britain and France have worked out and are implementing plans to commission a new generation of strategic offensive weapons which possess even greater destructive power and high target accuracy. For example, the United States has approved the plan for deploying the first 100 new MX ICBM from the period from 1986 through 1989. At least 30 billion dollars are to be spent on carrying out this program for deploying the designated missiles and the allocations for these purposes in 1983 (around 4.5 billion) have been increased by 2.3-fold in comparison with the previous. The Western press has stated that the purchasing of the first nine missiles is already being financed. As we can see, the American adventurers are in a hurry. In 1983 over 3 billion dollars were allocated for the building of nuclear missile submarines of the "Ohio" class and almost 800 million for purchasing 72 Trident-1 missiles for them. Almost 5 billion dollars have been allocated for working out and purchasing the first seven supersonic B-1B bombers.

Intense work is underway in developing new, more powerful and accurate Trident-2 missiles for the nuclear missile submarines of the "Ohio" class (a range of 11,000 km) and the strategic "invisible" bombers of the "Stealth" type. At the end of the 1980's and the start of the 1990's, these will begin to be received. For now, the B-52 strategic bombers which are currently in use are being modernized. On each they are mounting up to 20 cruise missiles with nuclear charges of 100 kilotons (with a firing range of 2,500 km). In 1983, there are plans to allocate funds to purchase 440 such missiles.

The conservative British government has adopted a decision in the 1990's to replace the existing four nuclear missile submarines carrying the Polaris missiles with new subs equipped with the American Trident-2 missiles. Under the Chevaline program, work is being continued on converting to a new multiple warhead for the existing Polaris missiles.

The strategic forces in France are also to be substantially strengthened. They are completing the replacement of the land-based S-3 medium-range strategic

missiles with the new S-3 missiles. The sixth nuclear submarine is being built and development has started on a new generation of nuclear missile subs. A M-4 sea-based missile is being developed and a mobile land-based strategic one as well as a medium-range air-to-surface guided missile for the Mirage-4A and Mirage-2000 aircraft.

In 1983, they plan to start deploying on the territory of a number of the bloc's states 572 so-called "Eurostrategic" missiles, including 108 Pershing-2 and 464 medium-range (2,500 km) land-based cruise missiles.

The NATO nations are developing and purchasing an enormous amount of weapons also for their general purpose forces. For example, in the United States the outlays for these purposes in 1983 should increase by 37 percent in comparison with 1982 and by 2.5-fold in comparison with 1980. Here primary attention is to be given to further increasing the might of the tactical nuclear as well as the chemical weapons. In recent years, the United States has carried out extensive work to replace the tactical nuclear warheads, primarily those deployed in Western Europe (7,000 units are stored there) with new, more powerful ones which have an improved guidance system. Here there is to be a substantial increase in the production capacity at the enterprises producing them. In 1981, full-scale production was started on the neutron warheads for the Lance guided missiles and the 203.2-mm howitzers deployed in Western Europe. In the summer of 1982, the American President approved a program for developing and producing neutron warheads for "small-caliber artillery pieces." The foreign press has pointed out that the given decision would lead to an increase in the arsenal of this barbarian weapon which is destined for use primarily in Europe by 2-3-fold.

Work on improving tactical nuclear weapons is being actively carried out in France as well. Here a new guided missile with a nuclear warhead is being developed to replace the Pluton missile and research is being continued in the area of creating a neutron weapon.

In all the bloc's nations, in accord with the long-range program, measures are being carried out widely to outfit the units and subunits with a new generation of conventional weapons. Here particular attention has been given to broadening the purchases of modern tanks and antitank weapons, primarily ATGM [anti-tank guided missiles]. In 1983, the United States plans to allocate 2 billion dollars for purchasing 776 Abrams M1 tanks and a total of over 7,000 of them will be purchased (11 billion dollars). The total number of tanks in the U.S. Army by the mid-1980's should rise up to 15,000 (at present, there are around 12,500).

The Bundeswehr Ground Forces are to receive new Leopard-2 tanks (as of now, 1,600 have been ordered). The Netherlands is to acquire 445 such vehicles. In Great Britain the Ministry of Defense has placed an order for 250 Challenger tanks (a modernized version of the Chieftain tank). The French Ground Forces continue to receive the AMX-30 tanks. The FRG has become the basic supplier of tanks in many of the bloc's countries. Its Leopards in recent years have been supplied to the armored units of Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Canada.

The troops are receiving large quantities of new infantry combat vehicles and combat reconnaissance vehicles, field artillery pieces, MLRS [multiple launch rocket system], ATGM, surface-to-air guided missiles, various types of helicopters and other military equipment.

The air forces of the member nations are also being rearmed with new aircraft including the F-15, F-16 and A-10 (United States), the Tornado (FRG, Great Britain and Italy), the Alpha Jet (FRG and France), the Mirage-F.1 and Jaguar (France). Some 348 F-16 fighters have been ordered for the air forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The Mirage-2000 is being developed in France. A large amount of various-purpose missiles is being purchased for the air forces.

The United States has developed production of the E-3A AWACS aircraft for the American Air Force and for the joint NATO Air Force. The North Atlantic bloc is forming so-called "early warning forces" (more accurately, for air reconnaissance) consisting of 18 E-3A aircraft and 11 English Nimrods. These are designed to reconnoiter the territories of the socialist countries to a depth of 400 km.

The NATO nations are assigned large amounts of money to equip their navies with new ships. Broad shipbuilding programs are being carried out in the United States, Great Britain, France as well as in the FRG. For example, in the United States, allocations for the construction and reequipping of ships in 1983 (18.7 billion dollars) have been increased by 2-fold in comparison with 1982. These funds are to be used to finance the construction of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, two nuclear missile submarines, two submarines, three guided missile cruisers and many other ships. The Reagan Administration intends to increase the number of ships in the Navy in the present decade up to 600 units (at present there are around 490). The navies will receive large amounts of combat aircraft, ASW helicopters and various missiles including the Tomahawk cruise missiles for surface vessels and submarines. Many different-purpose ships are to be launched in other nations of the bloc and predominantly guided missile ships and missile boats are to be built.

NATO is carefully analyzing the lessons of the Anglo-Argentine armed conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. In the opinion of foreign specialists, these can make definite adjustments in the shipbuilding programs and in the design of ships.

The Pentagon leadership, in planning aggressive actions in various regions of the world, has undertaken extensive work to increase the transport capability for strategic troop movements. Thus, the heavy C-5A military transports are being modernized in the aim of extending their service life and they also intend to produce another 50 such aircraft. Work is to be continued on developing the new CX aircraft and a program is being implemented for the extensive construction of transport ships (up to 1986, some 15.9 billion dollars will be spent for these purposes).

Contrary to the numerous proposals of the USSR on the peaceful use of space, the U.S. Administration is undertaking preparations for the broad militarization of space with the use of manned reusable spacecraft in order to base

missile and laser weapons on them in the aim of antisatellite and antimissile warfare as well as for making strikes from space. A space command has been organized in the American Air Force for direct leadership over these programs.

Among the peace-loving forces of the entire world, there has been particular concern over the increased activities by the U.S. militarists to significantly increase the potential of chemical weapons and primarily to extend the production of such barbarian means of mass destruction as the neuroparalytic toxins and binary type ammunition. In 1983 alone, 810 million dollars were allocated for these purposes and over the next 5 years 2.5 billion dollars are to be spent for this. The new toxins are destined to be used primarily in the European theaters of war.

Preparations of the bloc's armed forces for war. In the organizational development of the NATO armed forces, a policy has been set of their qualitative improvement primarily by saturation with modern weapons and combat equipment possessing great destructive action and high target accuracy (here priority has been given to the weapons of mass destruction). This is being carried out in accord with the long-range program adopted in 1978 according to which over the coming 15 years some 80 billion dollars are to be spent on additional measures to reinforce the bloc's formations and units in Europe, primarily in the Central European Theater of War.

The NATO Military Committee at the start of 1982 demanded that the member nations more actively carry out this program, having drawn, in particular, particular attention to its following areas: improving the tactical nuclear forces, accelerating the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, increasing the combat readiness of the troops, broadening the possibilities for conducting chemical warfare and the ability to quickly move large troop groups up to the forward lines in the early stage of the development of a critical situation, reinforcing the reserve components and improving the system for mobilization deployment.

The militarization programs adopted in NATO have not merely remained words on paper, but are being carried out. It is a question not only of an arms race, but also of numerous measures for reorganizing and regrouping the troops. Thus, in the second half of the 1970's and in the beginning of the 1980's, a substantial reorganization was carried out in the ground forces of many of the bloc's nations. This was aimed at further increasing the strike power and mobility of the formations and units by saturating them with new tanks, ATGM, helicopters, infantry combat vehicles and other military equipment. All the divisions of the British Rhine Army in the FRG were transformed into armored ones, the number of tank brigades has been increased in the Bundeswehr while the divisions and brigades have been reorganized into higher fire-powered and more maneuverable formations. The French and Italian ground forces have also undergone a substantial reorganization.

The United States is continuing to test out a new organization of heavy and light divisions. There, as is known, interventionist "rapid deployment forces" have been organized and these can be employed in various regions of the world.

As part of the fighting strength of the Navy, the Pentagon by 1990 intends to have 19 ship attack groups, including 15 carrier ones.

In the mid-1970's, the United States moved to the FRG an additional mechanized brigade in the aim of reinforcing the NATO Northern Group of Armies (NGA). The Pentagon at the beginning of 1982 made a decision to move the attack grouping of its troops located in the FRG closer to the forward lines near the frontiers of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. There has also been a significant strengthening of the group of American forces in the FRG in an emergency situation. In particular, during the first 10 days, they plan to send to West Germany from the United States an additional six divisions and up to 1,000 combat aircraft. From these formations, as the foreign press has announced, another army corps will be formed and this will be part of the NGA. The necessary supply dumps will be created in the next few years for deploying the new divisions on FRG territory and stationary shelters are to be built for 70 percent of the aircraft.

The North Atlantic bloc is presently endeavoring to pawn off on the world the idea of creating "multinational rapid deployment forces" like those existing in the United States and to give them the status of the "world's policeman."

The Command of the NATO Joint Armed Forces year by year continues to increase the scope and number of major troop and naval maneuvers and command-staff exercises. Each year, these are carried out in various regions of the bloc's zone. A particularly large number of these militaristic demonstrations is held in Central Europe and primarily on FRG territory which each autumn is turned, as the foreign press has announced, into an "arena of Atlantic engagements."

The series of autumn exercises and maneuvers carried out annually under a single plan (there are around 30 of these) under the general code name of "Autumn Forge" encompasses all regions of the bloc's zone. An enormous number of troops (over 300,000) and a large amount of military equipment from all the Armed Services participate in them. In the course of them they chiefly work out variations for preparing, initiating and conducting an aggressive war in Europe against the Warsaw Pact states.

All these exercises carried out close to the frontiers of the socialist commonwealth nations are clearly of a provocative nature and are aimed at increasing international tension. They are so close to a real combat situation that it is impossible to exclude their development into wide-scale aggression.

The expansion of the bloc. The U.S. and NATO leading circles have undertaken constant attempts to broaden the membership and zone of "responsibility" for the bloc and to create affiliates of it in various regions with the participation of the most reactionary regimes. In June 1982, by the efforts of the American militarists, Spain was brought into the North Atlantic Alliance and this is a flagrant violation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The U.S. and NATO leadership see in Spain primarily a source for further increasing the bloc's military potential and they are equally attracted by the important strategic position of this country. The Spanish Armed Forces (a total of 340,000 men) have 6 divisions and 14 separate brigades,

around 900 tanks, 200 combat and up to 500 auxiliary aircraft, more than 220 fighting ships, boats and auxiliary vessels. In the event of war, as the Italian magazine POLITICA ESTERI has pointed out, Spain could field up to 40 divisions.

The United States and NATO are constantly attempting to create a new bloc in the South Atlantic which would be the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) with the participation of the United States, Great Britain, South Africa and a number of Latin American nations. Plans are also being hatched to put together a closed military-political grouping in the Near and Middle East consisting of Israel and certain conservative Arab states.

In utilizing the aggressiveness of their Zionist friend, Israel, and the separate Camp David Accord, the NATO nations are presently occupying a part of the Sinai Peninsula, having assigned their own troop contingents to the so-called "multinational forces." The U.S. imperialist circles, having benefited from the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, are endeavoring to assert their political, economic and military hegemony in the region, involving other states of the bloc in this adventure. They also regularly send their ships on patrol in the Persian Gulf region. As we see, these nations without preliminary permission are "tapping" the oil-rich regions which are far outside the NATO zone.

Recently, the North Atlantic Alliance has shown the same practical interest in the South Atlantic, having demonstrated full solidarity with the English colonialists in their armed conflict against Argentina over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. As the foreign press has stated, a major NATO military base is now being built on the Falklands for exercising control over this strategically important region. Certainly, though, the southern boundary of the bloc's zone runs far to the north of these islands.

The activities of the American and NATO militarists at the present stage are dangerous, even very dangerous. We have every reason to say at present that imperialism is far from omnipotent. At present, the world of real socialism opposes decisively its aggressive plans. The necessity of strengthening the defense capability of the socialist commonwealth was reemphasized in the decisions of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet military along with the military from the armies of the fraternal socialist nations are vigilantly following the intrigues of the Atlantists and they are always ready to deal a crushing blow to the aggressor if it encroaches on the sacred frontiers of the multinational Soviet state which is celebrating its 60th jubilee.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON U.S. ARMS SALES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 16 Dec 82) pp 26-32

[Article by S. Ivanov: "The United States: Weapons Trade--A Threat to Peace"]

[Text] At the beginning of the 1980's, after the change of leadership in the White House, the growing militarization of the U.S. foreign economic ties has become an evermore acute problem in international relations. The United States, having placed a significantly greater emphasis on raw force in its aggressive foreign policy and having increased its direct military presence abroad, has in no way abandoned the concept of "total forces" which envisages the broadest involvement of other nations in the arms race and the greatest possible use of their resources for achieving the aims of American imperialism. The U.S. leadership has not in the slightest degree altered its views either on the exports of weapons to foreign states and this is considered one of the basic means for realizing this concept in practice. Moreover, it has irrationally set out to sharply broaden weapons trade without considering that these activities cause enormous harm to the peace and security of peoples.

The engine of U.S. expansion into the military markets of foreign countries was picking up speed long before the coming to power of the new administration. The sales of American weapons overseas had increased noticeably even in the 1960's. But the overseas military commercial operations of the Pentagon and private corporations acquired a particularly significant scope in the 1970's. From 1971 through the 1980 fiscal year, the United States received military orders totaling around 105 billion dollars from foreign states (not considering contracts which had been signed, but which subsequently were canceled) and delivered under them weapons totaling over 57 billion dollars (respectively, 8- and 6-fold more in comparison with the previous decade). In the 1970's, in the total volume of American military exports, the proportional amount of the commercial component as a result of the increased sales of weapons and military equipment and the simultaneous reduction in gratis military aid, reached more than 90 percent.

During this period, the geographic focus of American weapons deliveries changed fundamentally. While previously a predominant share of them went to the immediate NATO allies and other developed states, in the 1970's the basic flow of weapons with the mark "Made in the United States" began to head to the

developing nations and primarily those which were located in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area (Table 1). By the start of the 1980's, the share of nations from the so-called Third World in the total volume of U.S. military sales was around 60 percent.

Table 1

Export Deliveries of U.S. Weapons in 1971-1981 Fiscal Years
(in billion dollars)*

| Importers | 1971-1975 | 1976-1980 | 1981 (estimate) |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Developed capitalist nations | 8.2 | 16.2 | 6.0 |
| Including: | | | |
| Israel | 2.6 | 4.4 | 1.3 |
| Japan | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| FRG | 2.0 | 2.2 | 0.6 |
| Great Britain | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.5 |
| Australia | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Canada | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.4 |
| Netherlands | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Greece | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.2 |
| Spain | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Italy | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| Developing countries | 5.0 | 27.5 | 5.4 |
| Including: | | | |
| Saudi Arabia | 1.2 | 10.6 | 3.1 |
| Thailand | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Jordan | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Egypt | under 50 mil. | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Turkey | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 |
| Kuwait | under 50 mil. | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Morocco | under 50 mil. | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Iran | 2.3 | 8.5 | -- |
| Other | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Total | 13.3 | 44.1 | 11.6 |

*For cash and credit, including value of military-type services provided.

Significant shifts had also occurred in the structure of U.S. military trade with other nations. The most modern and most powerful weapons began to be sent from American arsenals overseas in ever-larger amounts (Table 2). Sales also increased even for equipment which the U.S. Armed Forces themselves were just beginning to receive, including models which had no analogues in the capitalist world.

Table 2

Export Sales of Certain Types of Weapons and Military Equipment by the U.S.
(at the start of 1982 fiscal year)

| Model | Purchaser (in parentheses, the number of purchased examples) |
|--|--|
| Pershing-1 operational-tactical missiles | FRG (137) |
| M60A3 tanks | Egypt (439), Israel (200), Jordan (100) |
| Fighters: | |
| F-14 | Iran (80) |
| F-15 | Saudi Arabia (62), Israel (40), Japan (100) ¹ |
| F-16 | Belgium (116) ² , Netherlands (124) ² , Israel (75), Norway (72) ² , Denmark (58) ² , Egypt (40) |
| F-18 | Canada (138) |
| F-111 | Australia (28) |
| E-3A AWACS aircraft | NATO (18) ² |
| Sea-based Trident-1 ballistic missiles | Great Britain (100) ³ |
| Guided missile frigates of the "Oliver H. Perry" type | Australia (4), Spain (3) ¹ |
| Land-based P-3 patrol aircraft | Japan (45) ¹ , Australia (20), Canada (18, in the CP-140 version), Netherlands (13), Spain (8), Norway (7), Iran (6) and New Zealand (5) |

¹ Licensed production. Of the 100 F-15 aircraft and the 45 P-3 purchased by Japan, correspondingly 16 and 7 should be supplied from the United States (of these, 6 and 4 in parts and assemblies).

² Joint production.

³ At present, Great Britain intends to purchase 72 Trident-2 missiles in their place.

In the 1970's, the system of state incentives for military deliveries continued to be improved. In particular, there was a sharp rise in the scale of credit-
ing. Over the 10 years (1971-1980 fiscal years) the total credits reached 20
billion dollars and a significant portion of them was provided on very easy
terms. The system of weapons trade became even stronger. In 1978, in just
the Defense Department 13,500 employees were working full-time in activities
related to overseas weapons deliveries, according to the official data, while
administrative expenditures had reached several hundreds of millions of dollars.

Such activities by the American "merchants of death" quite rightly has caused
alarm among broad strata of the world community and among the politicians in
many states of the world. In the United States itself, voices urging the
government to restrict military exports have been sounding out evermore strong-
ly. Members of Congress and various public organizations have repeatedly made

similar appeals to the administration. Under these conditions, the nation's leadership has endeavored in every possible way to conceal its devotion to the "dangerous business" and to depict itself as a supporter for curtailing this. Such aims were pursued, in particular, by the so-called "policy of restrictions" proclaimed by former President Carter for the exports of conventional weapons (the Directive of 13 May 1977). However, these "restrictions" had virtually no restraint on the flourishing of weapons trade. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that by the end of the Carter Administration the Pentagon's portfolio of export military orders had "swollen" to the record amount of 55 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the declarations about a "new policy" for a long time served as a propaganda cover for U.S. expansion on the international military market.

However, this camouflage with cynical frankness was discarded with the coming to power of President Reagan. Just several months after his assuming the office (8 July 1981), he replaced the Carter directive with his own which, in the expression of TIME magazine, "put an end" to the symbolic restrictions on weapons trade. It stated directly that the United States "could not alone defend the interests" of the West and in this regard "should not only increase its own military potential, but also be ready to help its friends and allies increase their military capabilities by the turning over of conventional weapons...." The directive in fact legitimized the policy of an unrestrained broadening of weapons sales overseas.

In adhering to this policy, the present U.S. leadership has carried out a number of organizational measures aimed at encouraging American military trade expansion abroad. Thus, the U.S. ambassadors have been given instructions to aid in every possible way in the exports of weapons and military equipment, the practice of easy crediting for purchasers has been broadened and a special purchase fund has been set up designed for the early purchase of weapons the deliveries of which for various reasons (in particular, due to the great length of the production cycle) cannot be carried out in sufficiently short times. Other measures have also been adopted helping to sell American military products on foreign markets.

As a result, in the 1981-1982 fiscal years, the United States sold 37.5 billion dollars of weapons to other nations and this is 21 percent more in comparison with the last 2 years of the Carter Administration.* In the 1982 fiscal year, a lamentable "record" was set with the export military sales comprising over 27 billion dollars (Table 3). In the 1981 fiscal year, military deliveries reached an unprecedentedly high level (11.6 billion). In order to justify the arms race imposed on other nations, the Reagan Administration has created new variations on the worn-out theme of the "Soviet military threat." The essence of these subterfuges is clear: to eliminate the guilt for trading in weapons,

*The data given in the article on the export sales of U.S. weapons in cost as well as quantitative terms in the 1981-1982 fiscal years are an estimate based chiefly on the administration's notifications to Congress on the intended deals.

for destabilizing the situation, escalating wars and violence in various regions of the world and shifting this blame to the other side.

Table 3

Export Sales of U.S. Weapons in 1981-1982 Fiscal Years
(in billion dollars)*

| Purchasers | 1981 (estimate) | 1982 (estimate) |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Developed capitalist nations | 5.1 | 7.0 |
| Including: | | |
| Australia | 0.3 | 0.7 |
| Israel | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| Great Britain | 0.5 | 2.6 |
| Netherlands | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Japan | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Canada | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| FRG | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Greece | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Italy | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Switzerland | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Developing countries | 4.1 | 19.8 |
| Including: | | |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.2 | 12.1 |
| Egypt | 0.6 | 2.0 |
| Pakistan | 0.1 | 1.7 |
| Venezuela | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| Turkey | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Jordan | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Kuwait | under 50 mil. | 0.2 |
| Thailand | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Other | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| Total | 10.4 | 27.1 |

*For cash and credit, including value of military type services (including sales of weapons by U.S. private firms calculated from the value of the export licenses).

In fact, it is not the imaginary "Soviet military threat" which is the reason for the boom in American weapons trade. The rapid expansion of the scale of these activities has been the direct result of the policy set by the United States of sharply increasing the militaristic preparations in an attempt to achieve military superiority over the USSR and a dominant position in the world. The U.S. ruling circles cannot conceive of carrying out this policy without broadening the political influence of American imperialism in various regions and nations of the world, without limiting the growing authority of the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth nations in the international scene.

without broadening the political influence of American imperialism in various regions and nations of the world, without limiting the growing authority of the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth nations on the international scene, without strengthening and more widely utilizing the military capabilities of "allies and friendly" countries, without creating and maintaining bases, support points and American weapons dumps overseas and ensuring access to sources of strategic raw materials. The most diverse means are utilized for carrying out these tasks however weapons trade is considered one of the most effective among these and this has undergone a good test of time, regardless of individual failures (including, for example, the unsuccessful attempts to rescue the Shah's regime in Iran by massive military deliveries).

Certain government documents and statements by representatives of the ruling administration show precisely such an attitude toward the overseas sales of weapons and military equipment. Thus, the Directive of President Reagan of 8 July 1981 directly states that weapons trade is "a very important means for strengthening U.S. military might on a global scale and is an inseparable component of its foreign policy." The Deputy Secretary of State J. L. Buckley stated before Congress that "a considerate policy of weapons delivery can actually play a primary role in shaping our foreign policy and achieving the basic goals in ensuring national security." When he was Secretary of State, A. Haig described weapons exports as "a logical continuation of U.S. military efforts."

The data on the "geography" of this business also confirms that it is of independent significance for the U.S. ruling circles and this is determined chiefly by the military-political interests of American imperialism. In the 1981-1982 fiscal year, the United States sold weapons and military equipment to more than 110 countries (including to the colonial possessions of the imperialist states, that is, to a majority of the world's nations) and this conforms fully to the hegemonistic aspirations of Washington. At the same time, there is maintained a strictly selective U.S. approach to the purchasers and this provides a differentiation of the latter according to the "interest" of the American militarists in them.

Washington pays particular attention to providing weapons to the states which are members in the aggressive military-political blocs as well as those having bilateral military agreements with the United States. In the 1981-1982 fiscal year, weapons valued at 6.1 billion dollars were sold just to the NATO partners (including its new, 16th member, Spain). With the aid of the weapons and military equipment deliveries, the military potential is increased primarily for such NATO allies as Great Britain and the FRG. Precisely these nations are the first to receive the most modern weapons systems designed to "intimidate" the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states. Thus, according to the data of the Western press, in the summer of the current year the Pentagon officially notified Germany of the intended sales to Great Britain of 12 Trident-I sea-based strategic missiles (in the place of 108 Trident-I missiles the delivery contract for which had been concluded in the 1977 fiscal year). The former press has also announced plans to turn over to the Bundeswehr 41 Pershing-I operational-tactical missiles "in the most modern version." However, the United States has not shipped other members of the bloc in its "attention." In particular, it has noticeably decreased its activities in Spain. In endeavoring to secure various commissions of a political and military nature from the

government of this nation, Washington has offered Madrid large batches of modern weapons. One of the planned deals which has already been approved by Spain envisages the delivery of 84 F-18 fighters worth more than 3 billion dollars.

Weapons sales to the U.S. ally in the ANZUS Military Pact, Australia, have reached unprecedentedly large scale. The value of just 75 F-18 aircraft the delivery program for which has already been approved is a little more than 3 billion dollars. It will cost the Australian taxpayers several hundred more millions to purchase 10 shore-based R-3C patrol aircraft. As the progressive Australian press has pointed out, behind these deals stand completely definite interests of Washington which is endeavoring to create on this continent its own military bases and to have the American Armed Forces utilize the military installations already existing there. Washington is also counting on aid from Canberra in strengthening its positions in the Southern Pacific.

The present leadership of the United States has outlined an extensive program of military deliveries to Japan which has been assigned a "special role" in defending American interests in the region of East Asia and the Western Pacific. In endeavoring to broaden Japanese participation in "maintaining the balance of forces" in the area (in particular, to increase its contribution to the defense of the sea and air lines of communications running across this "vitally important" zone for the United States), Washington has promised to deliver Japan 4 E-2C AWACS aircraft, 2 C-130 military transports, 1 launcher and 40 Harpoon antishipping missiles, 1 launcher for the Tartar surface-to-air missiles, 4 Mk-15 Vulcan-Phalanx 20-mm artillery systems and other equipment.

A strong flow of weapons is also being channeled to the "strategic treasure-house" (the words of President Reagan) in the Far East, Israel. The United States has consistently carried out a policy of increasing Israeli military might, viewing this nation as its main ally in the region. Tel-Aviv, in addition to the already-received weapons (in just 10 years, from the 1971 through the 1980 fiscal year, it has imported almost 7 billion dollars of weapons from the United States) is in the near future to receive 11 F-15 fighters, 75 F-16, 100 Advanced Hawk SAM and other modern combat equipment. During the current fiscal year, military sales to Israel will triple in comparison with last year. Thus, a "green light" has been given for carrying out new aggressive actions analogous to the one recently undertaken in Lebanon where thousands of completely innocent persons perished from weapons put by the United States in the hands of the Israeli terrorists.

The Reagan Administration has sharply increased weapons sales to a number of the developing nations which are to play the role of U.S. strongpoints in the struggle against the national liberation movements (with an obvious lie identified by the White House with "international terrorism"), serve as sources of major types of strategic raw materials and help broaden the network of American military bases and installations overseas.

Thus, according to preliminary data, contracts for an enormous amount comprising over 10 billion dollars have been concluded with Saudi Arabia. These provide the delivery of modern weapons and military equipment, including 5 E-1A AWACS aircraft and the ground equipment for the AWACS system, 6 KC-135 tanker aircraft, additional equipment for the previously purchased 62 F-15 fighters.

and around 1,180 AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Officials in Washington have frankly admitted that Rivadh will pay for this not only in "petrodollars," but also in certain "concessions corresponding to American interests."

These same notorious "interests" have caused a broadening of weapons sales to Oman, Kenya and Somali. Washington has offered these nations large batches of weapons and military equipment and has provided the necessary credits in exchange for providing their territories for U.S. military bases.

After the coming to power of President Mubarak in Egypt, the United States, in endeavoring to maintain its positions in this country, accelerated the carrying out of previously concluded contracts and also signed new ones. In 1982, Cairo was sold 1 billion dollars worth of weapons and military equipment and this is 3-fold more than in comparison with the previous year. According to data in the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, the Pentagon has worked out a five-year plan for increasing military deliveries to Egypt and this is planned for the 1983-1987 fiscal years. In particular, there are plans to give Cairo an additional 40 modern F-16 fighter bombers, 24 AH-1 helicopter gunships, 4 E-2C AWACS aircraft, 20 C-130 military transports, 8 Advanced Hawk SAM batteries, 400-600 M60A3 tanks, 500 M113 armored personnel carriers, 200 launchers for the TOW ATGM [antitank guided missile] and a large amount of missiles for them.

The present military-political leadership of the United States has decided to sharply increase the sale of weapons to Pakistan. In the 1981-1982 fiscal years, deals totaling 1.8 billion dollars were concluded with this country and this was 31-fold more in comparison with the previous 2-year period. The deals envisage the deliveries of 40 F-16 aircraft, 10 AH-1S aircraft, 100 M48A5 tanks, 35 M88A1 armored repair-salvage vehicles (ARSV), 24 M901 TOW self-propelled ATGM launchers and over 1,000 missiles for them, 40 203.2-mm M110A2 howitzers, 100 155-mm M109A2 self-propelled howitzers, 75 155-mm M198 towed howitzers and other weapons. A significant part of these deliveries will be paid for from credits provided on easy terms. In exchange for this the strategists from the Pentagon are planning to use Pakistani ports and airfields as support points for the American "rapid deployment forces" (particular hopes, the foreign press has written, are being placed on the port of Gwadar the position of which close to the Persian Gulf makes it possible to quickly transport men and equipment to this region). In addition, Washington is hoping that in the future Pakistan will remain a staging area for conducting the "undeclared war" against democratic Afghanistan.

Military sales are increasing to a number of Southeast Asian states, in particular to the Philippines and Indonesia. As before, weapons are being sold in large amounts to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The basic aims pursued by Washington in this are to recover the lost positions in the region, to broaden its if not direct at least indirect military presence there and to aggravate, in utilizing the so-called "Kampuchea problem," the relations of the ASEAN members with the other countries of Indochina.

The United States is continuing to broaden the exports of weapons to its allies in the Far East. Thus, weapons sales to South Korea in the 1981-1982 fiscal

years more than doubled in comparison with the previous 2-year period and exceeded 1.6 billion dollars (the basic portion of this amount is made up of the cost of 36 F-16 fighter bombers, 1,089 M551 Sheridan tanks, 31 Mohawk ASST and 170 Advanced Hawk SAM). Thus, as the foreign press has pointed out, the plans are "materially strengthened" for creating in the Far East a "triangular regional security system" (with the participation of the United States, Japan and South Korea) which have long been under consideration by the U.S. ruling circles.

The Reagan Administration has noticeably strengthened military support for a number of Latin American dictatorships. Thus, in the 1981-1982 fiscal years, according to preliminary data, Honduras was sold 2-fold more weapons than in the previous 4 years and for El Salvador, the figure was 1.5-fold more. For covering these activities a noisy campaign has been raised about "Soviet-Cuban interference" in Latin America; however, as the progressive Western press has pointed out, it is quite apparent that the deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the reactionary regimes which are to blame for the elimination of tens of thousands of people pursue the aim of stifling the process of revolutionary changes on the continent as this process is undermining the imperialist policy being carried out here by American imperialism. The U.S. militaristic circles are endeavoring to broaden weapons trade not only out of military-political considerations, but also out of economic ones. For the American military-industrial complex, these activities are extremely attractive mainly because they are an important source of profit. In addition, the solving of certain technical and economic problems raised by the military-technical revolution for the defense industry to a significant degree depends upon weapons trade. This involves primarily the increased cost of the weapons as a consequence of their increased combat effectiveness, mobility and armor as this objectively creates contradictions between the desire of the U.S. leadership to increase militaristic preparations and its actual abilities limited by certain economic constraints. The activities of selling weapons on the international market, in the opinion of the Pentagon economists, to a significant degree lessens these contradictions, as these increase the amount of produced weapons and military equipment and thereby checks the tendency for their cost to rise. At the expense of foreign purchasers the U.S. Defense Department "saves" large amounts of money as each billion dollars of military sales overseas provides, according to the data of the Congressional Budget Administration, a "savings" totaling 70 million dollars.

Weapons trade is also viewed as an important means for expanding the readiness of the defense industry to satisfy the demands of the U.S. Armed Forces under extraordinary conditions. Its apologists have pointed out that due to export activities, the production facilities of the sector are broadened and, thus, when, makes it possible to shorten the time for starting up production as well as expenditures on it.

American militarism is also interested in the sale of weapons for the reason that these activities help to maintain the balance of trade and payments and hence to preserve a state of affairs which the United States gains from. Thus, for the substantial growing momentum correlated by the maintenance of U.S. military overseas as well as by the construction and modernization of military bases there (in actuality, exported there from such sales and exports) has a great impact.

portion of the direct U.S. military expenditures abroad, and in individual years all these expenditures. Under conditions where the classic means for solving the problem of balancing external payments (the change in the interest rate, the use of the tax system and so forth) are ineffective or are becoming fraught with serious political complications, as was the case, for example, in the recent sharp increase in the interest rates, the above-indicated "merit" of weapons trade, in the opinion of the U.S. military-political leadership, is particularly important.

These are the true reasons for U.S. expansion on the international weapons market. These cannot be concealed by hypocritical references to the need of ensuring the "security of allies and friends" when confronted with the "Soviet military threat." American military equipment brings not security, but rather death and suffering to the peoples of the world and merely increases the arms race.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON U.S., NATO TANK TACTICS

Moscow ZAKUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 16 Dec 82) pp 37-42

[Article by Col (Res) P. Isayev: "Tank Warfare (According to the Views of Foreign Military Specialists)"]

[Text] The military-political leadership of the United States and the aggressive NATO bloc in the general range of measures to further increase the fire power and strike force of the ground forces as well as improving the tactics of combat operations by the formations, units and subunits give great significance to the problem of combating tanks and other enemy armored targets in modern combat and an operation.

The foreign press has pointed out that tanks, with their high mobility and capacity to operate on rugged terrain, with their dependable armor and fire power, remain the most important means of armed combat and are one of the basic types of weapons in modern armies. They are assigned a leading role in carrying out various tasks in all types of combat operations employing both nuclear weapons as well as conventional ones.

According to the data of the Western Press, the experience of previous wars and the exercises conducted in the subsequent period by the ground forces of the United States and other NATO countries have affirmed that the role of tanks as the main strike force of the ground troops and the basic means of advance in combat and an operation has not only grown stronger, but also substantially increased. For precisely this reason, there is also greater significance for countering the large groupings of tanks and other armored vehicles on the battlefield. However, the ever-increasing process of saturating modern armies with tanks has brought about an equally rapid development in antitank weapons. This, in the opinion of foreign specialists, has naturally exacerbated the contradiction between them. The duel between tanks and antitank weapons has now become an inseparable part of any scale of combat operations and the most important context of modern combined-arms combat (operations). While previously the countering of tanks was considered one of the types of troop combat support (antitank defense), under present-day conditions this has been turned into one of the main tasks of the formations and field forces in a battle and an operation.

The fundamental shifts in the development of military affairs brought about by scientific-technical progress and the increased military-economic potential of states have caused the appearance of qualitatively new, more effective weapons and have significantly broadened the limits of antitank combat both in terms of range and in terms of the scale of hitting armored targets. An example of this would be the 1973 Arab-Israeli War which involved over 6,000 tanks on both sides and their total losses over the 2 weeks were around 50 percent of the tank fighting strength. This, in the opinion of Western military specialists, is commensurable only with the possible mass losses from nuclear weapons. The Western experts consider that the main reasons for such high losses were, on the one hand, the appearance of new, more effective antitank weapons on the battlefield and primarily the antitank missile complexes (ATMC) and, on the other, the weak organizing of countermeasures. Tank losses from various types of weapons were distributed in the following manner (in percent): over 50 from the ATCM (antitank guided missile), around 22 from tank fire, and around 28 from aviation, antitank mines and other weapons.

ATMC first appeared in the middle of the 1950's as a result of the search for new, more effective means to counter the numerous and constantly improving combat vehicles on the battlefield. Their basic merits were: a high probability of hitting the target on the first round (0.7-0.9) for the entire range of possible firing distances, high armor-piercing capability (the thickness of the armor pierced can reach 500-600 mm), as well as comparatively low weight and small size ensuring sufficient mobility on the battlefield and concealed concentration in individual sectors.

In placing great hopes on precisely this type of weapon in combating tanks, foreign specialists at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's carried out extensive research in the area of developing new, more powerful antitank weapons.

As a result of this work, the armies of the basic NATO countries received the so-called second generation ATMC such as the American TOW and Dracon and the French-made German HOT and Milan with a semiautomatic control system. According to the data in the foreign press, at present the United States is developing third-generation ATMC which will replace the TOW and Dracon ATMC. Third-generation ATMC are also being developed in the FRG, Great Britain and France.

The manuals of the U.S. and other NATO armies have pointed out that antitank weapons should be employed in close cooperation with the infantry, artillery, tanks and other branches of troops as well as with one another. In choosing the firing positions for them, particular attention should be paid to camouflage, controlling the position in the terrain and the capacity for surprise opening of fire, particularly in the flank and rear of moving tanks. The weapons should be emplaced in depth so as to be able to fire at maximum range and ensure a continuous fire effect on the enemy.

It is emphasized that in the course of combating tanks, the opening of frontal fire against them is to be avoided as in this instance the ATMC positions can quickly be detected and eliminated. Basic attention should be paid to firing at the flank of moving tanks. This is particularly important with firing ranges of 1,000-2,000 m at which the tanks have an advantage over the

ATMC in hitting targets on the battlefield. The necessity of flanking fire is also determined by the fact that observation by the crew of a tank traveling with closed hatches is restricted and concentrated mainly straight ahead and this impedes the detecting of antitank weapons operating in the flanks.

Western military specialists have given great significance to the moving of the ATMC on the battlefield. In changing firing positions, it is recommended that skillful use be made of the natural features and other shelters so as to avoid the hitting of the ATMC by enemy fire. The changing or taking up of firing positions by the ATMC crews and their movement on the battlefield should be supported by artillery and firearms fire using smokescreens. Attention is also drawn to precise control of ATMC fire and this should ensure the concentrating of fire to destroy the selected targets simultaneously from several firing positions which are a significant distance apart and spread out both along the front and in depth. Here the launching of the missiles should be carried out at a moment of causing maximum destruction to the enemy tanks and not give away the ATMC positions and crews, leaving them the advantage of the "first shot." In organizing firing, it is recommended that a sector of fire, reference points, the sequence of hitting the target and the lines for shifting fire be designated. For ensuring effective and continuous fire in the designated sector, primarily at great ranges, it is advisable to organize paired ATMC crews and the distance between their firing positions should be at least 300 m. Foreign military experts feel that such employment makes it possible for their crews to successively move on the battlefield to new positions without thereby losing the opportunity of firing at enemy armored targets. In the opinion of foreign specialists, if the ATMC crew opens fire from maximum range first then it will have an advantage of 5:1 over the tanks.

As has been stated in the Western press, the ATMC, particularly at ranges of 3-4 km, can be employed in decentralized and centralized manners. Their employment is decentralized in those instances when they are attached to motorized infantry or tank crews, squads or platoons. But if the nature of the terrain restricts or excludes enemy tank operations ahead of these subunits, then their regular ATMC can be assigned to other units operating on tank approaches. The centralized employment of the ATMC assumes the concentration of a significant portion of them directly under the battalion commander for massed employment in a threatened sector.

Foreign specialists, in organizing and conducting antitank combat, assign an important place to coordinating the joint actions of the ATMC and the tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles and other combat equipment. Their firing positions should be placed in such a manner as to hit the enemy armored targets at ranges over 1,500 m and cover their own tanks from the flanks in the aim of supporting their combat operations. In the event of a retreat, the ATMC crews move first under the cover of tank fire. After taking up new firing positions from which they can effectively support the tanks, the latter begin to change their positions.

Antitank helicopters are a comparatively new and highly effective means of antitank combat. Their creation and development have been directly influenced

In American terminology they are called fire support helicopters.--Editors.

by the combat experience of employing helicopters in local wars in Southeast Asia and the Near East. Abroad it is considered that a modern antitank helicopter in a single combat sortie is capable of destroying 2-4 enemy tanks.

The advantage of these helicopters over other antitank weapons is primarily in the much greater speed of movement as well as the ability to employ the on-board weapons at maximum firing range regardless of terrain conditions. In addition to this, the performance of the helicopters provides their high mobility, concealed approach to the armored object, surprise of attack and diverse forms of combat employment.

According to announcements in the foreign press, at present the armies of the leading NATO countries are armed with the following types of antitank helicopters: AH-1Q and AN1S (United States), BO-105P (West Germany), Lynx WG.13 (Great Britain) and the SA342M Gazelle (France) equipped with the TOW or HOT ATGM.

In the next few years, there are plans to commission new helicopters, for example the AH-64A with 16 Hellfire ATGM (United States) and the A.129 (Italy).

Recently, the commands of the U.S. and other NATO armies have begun to support a tendency for the massed employment of antitank helicopters against large tank groupings. The practical embodiment of this has been the creation in the ground forces formations of the bloc's leading states of special antitank helicopter subunits and units designed exclusively to combat enemy armored group targets. Thus, in the United States a separate antitank helicopter brigade has been organized (with 135 antitank helicopters). In the estimate of foreign specialists, this is capable in one sortie of destroying over 300 tanks. Army aviation battalions (each with 42 fire support helicopters) have been formed in the infantry, mechanized, armored and air assault divisions. In the Bundeswehr army corps they have organized antitank helicopter regiments (one in each) with 56 BO-105P antitank helicopters. Helicopter antitank subunits are also found in the armies of Great Britain and France. The presence of special antitank units and subunits in the formations of the NATO armies has made it possible for them to create in the combat and operational configuration of the troops qualitatively new elements which are highly mobile antitank reserves in helicopters and these in a short period of time can be committed to action for repelling attacks by large enemy tank groups.

At present, judging from information in the Western press, in the NATO armies theoretical research is being done to improve the tactics of antitank helicopters in combating tanks. A number of these ideas is being worked out in practice in exercises and maneuvers.

As a result of studying the experience of previous local wars and the exercises conducted in recent years, foreign military specialists have concluded that as a consequence of the great saturating of the battlefield with armored vehicles, the antitank helicopters should most effectively be used on a centralized basis (without disrupting the organizational and tactical integrity). Here it is recommended that a company of antitank helicopters be employed against a tank subunit (battalion), a helicopter battalion against a tank regiment (brigade) and an antitank helicopter brigade against a tank division. The actions

of antitank helicopters in small groups (two or three helicopters) against one armored target are considered ineffective.

The destroying of armored objects is entrusted to combat helicopters or combined aircraft-helicopter groups. The foreign press has pointed out that the typical composition of a probable combat group can include up to six-eight antitank helicopters and three-four reconnaissance helicopters.

In the course of carrying out the task of destroying armored enemy objects, the helicopter group can operate in the following manners: make successive strikes against targets or simultaneous strikes in several groups. The first method is to be employed in those instances when it is essential to provide continuous fire at the enemy. In this instance, one-third of the helicopters is attacking, one-third is enroute and one-third is at the forward point for taking on ammunition and fuel.

The second method is preferred when it is essential to make a massed strike against large enemy tank groupings in maximum limited times. However, in this instance the possibility of providing a continuous fire effect on the enemy is excluded (a second return of the helicopters to the firing line is possible only after 45-60 minutes).

The choice of one or another method is determined directly by the commander of the formation (unit) for whom the antitank helicopter subunits are operating, proceeding from the actually developing situation on the battlefield.

Tactical aviation is considered an effective means for combating tanks following the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the exercises conducted in the United States and NATO. The foreign press has announced that in the course of the Arab-Israeli War, 58 Maverick guided missiles destroyed 51 tanks. The most powerful weapons for fighting against tanks are considered to be the ground attack planes such as the A-10A (United States) and the Alpha Jet (FRG, France) equipped with air-to-ground guided missiles, 30-mm rapid firing cannons, cluster bombs with small-caliber hollow-charge bombs, antitank mines and incendiary bombs.

NATO specialists have assigned an important role in countering armored targets to joint operations by aviation and the combat antitank and reconnaissance helicopters. According to announcements in the American press, the United States has worked out and tested in experimental exercises the tactics for operations against tanks by the A-10A ground attack planes and the AH-1S antitank helicopters. This is based upon the principle of an alternating run against the targets (initially the helicopters and then the aircraft) with the alternating of the directions of the runs and the delimiting of the attacks in time. As the conducted exercises showed, the shells of the 30-mm cannons fired from 1,000 m destroyed virtually any mobile armored objects while the Maverick guided

For more detail on cooperation between the army aviation helicopters and the A-10 aircraft, see *VOYENNOYE SOYUZHENIYE*, No. 6, 1982, pp. 30-31. --Editors

missiles destroyed these targets in being launched from a slant range of more than 7,500 m. In the estimate of American specialists, the combined use of the antitank helicopters and ground attack planes increases by several-fold the possibilities of destroying enemy armored targets and at the same time significantly reduces the losses of one's own aviation.

Among the general purpose weapons, one of the most massive types of weapons is field artillery which makes it possible to hit tanks and other enemy armored vehicles both with direct laying and from indirect firing positions. As the foreign press has stated, the most effective artillery systems to combat enemy armored targets are 155- and 203.2-mm howitzers in use by the NATO armies. Special cluster-type ammunition equipped with antitank mines and hollow-charge destructive elements have been introduced into the units of fire for the given gun systems. In the aim of increasing the effectiveness of hitting the armored target on the first round, for the 155-mm howitzer the United States has worked out and adopted a guided artillery projectile, the M-712 Copperhead with a laser homing head which, judging from information in the foreign press, provides a rather high accuracy of hitting armored targets in firing from indirect positions.

The Western specialists view the multiple launch missile systems such as the Lark (UK), MLRS (United States) and the Raphael (France) with a firing range of 11-40 km as ineffective means for combating tanks and other armored vehicles. The development of unguided missiles with cluster warheads armed with antitank mines and hollow-charge subelements with final-leg homing will make it possible, in the opinion of foreign specialists, to effectively counter enemy armored objects even at the distant approaches to the forward defensive edge. The cluster warheads are to be used for hitting tanks and other armored vehicles on the move, in concentration areas and on the lines for deploying into battle formations.

In the armies of the United States and other NATO countries, great attention is given to equipping the infantry with close combat antitank weapons designed to combat enemy armored targets at ranges up to 250-500 m. Among these are the hand-held antitank grenade launchers and rifle antitank grenades. These complement the other special antitank weapons and they have basically been given for use in completing the destruction of enemy armored objects which survive from the fire of long- and medium-range weapons.

In solving the problem of antitank combat, an important place, in the opinion of foreign specialists, is to be given to the use of engineer antitank means designed for the construction of antitank obstacles on the probable sectors of enemy tank operations in the aim of checking their advance, impeding maneuvers and creating conditions for destroying the tanks by other antitank weapons. The various types of antitank mines comprise the basis of such engineer-designed means.

The command of the Pentagon and the NATO bloc has proposed solving the problem of combating enemy armored targets also by widely employing tanks which are an effective antitank weapon at ranges up to 1,000 m. It is felt that a modern tank requires only one round to hit a stationary armored target with a probability of 0.5 at a range of 1,500 m, while it takes 13 rounds for a medium tank from

World War II. However, in the opinion of Western experts, with the appearance of highly efficient antitank weapons, tanks are becoming evermore vulnerable on the battlefield and need additional protection. Because of this, the basic actions to counter enemy armored objects are to be entrusted to special anti-tank weapons while tanks are to be employed chiefly to exploit the success in combat and an operation. The M1 Abrams tanks (United States), the Leopard-1 (FRG) and the ZMX-3032 (France) which are being received by the ground forces as well as the future vehicles being developed will make it possible to significantly broaden the capabilities of the tanks in combating armored targets on the battlefield and raise their role as an antitank weapon.

In recent years, announcements have appeared in the foreign press on development in the United States of a comprehensive operational-tactical antitank system which has been named Assault Breaker and used to destroy ground armored targets. In the estimate of American specialists, this system will make it possible to hit tanks and other armored vehicles at ranges of 180-200 km.

In organizing and conducting engagements against tanks in an offensive, chief attention, in the opinion of foreign military experts, should be given to their fire neutralization even before one's troops go over to the attack. Here tactical air strikes and fire by field artillery and antitank helicopters play a major role. It is recommended that their main efforts be focused on attacking the tanks and antitank weapons in the enemy strongpoints and centers of resistance. The final destruction of the tanks and antitank weapons of an enemy on the defensive should be carried out by decisive actions of the advancing tanks and motorized infantry. In destroying armored objects and antitank weapons, a leading role is assigned to one's own advancing tanks which are the best antitank weapon in close combat.

Combating tanks on the defensive has assumed particular significance and this, judging from press releases, has now begun to have a clearly expressed antitank nature. The main role will be given over to the antitank weapons, particularly to the ATMs, the antitank helicopters, the conventional and rocket artillery, the tactical air force, the engineer-designed antitank means and so forth. A characteristic feature of modern defense is its increased capacity to make pre-emptive strikes against enemy tanks and tank groupings at distant approaches to the forward edge, that is, in the concentration areas, on a march, and on deployment lines where they can suffer significant losses which can lead to the collapse of the offensive or its aborting.

As a consequence of the mass saturation of the troops with new, highly effective antitank weapons, there has been further development in the principles of training and conducting the combat of tanks directly on the battlefield. Among the basic of these are the following: high activity in combating armored targets, operating to a increased depth of the strikes made against them, concentration in combat with antitank weapons at the tanks, the carrying out of rapid maneuvers by the antitank men and equipment on the ground and in the air, the

the work carried out by this system, the SUBSTANTIAL VARYING (CORRECTION)
to 8. 1981, by the Editors.

making of pre-emptive strikes against them, the imposing of one's will on the enemy and the aborting of an offensive by large masses of tanks are considered to be a superior manifestation of activeness); the massing of the antitank weapons on the main, crucial sector and at the essential moment of combat; surprise at making strikes against armored targets, due to which the greatest success can be achieved in knocking out the tanks even by smaller forces than the enemy's; secure defense of one's tanks and antitank weapons against enemy strikes.

In widely publicizing the measures being carried out in the United States and other NATO countries to improve and create new models of antitank weapons, the Western press, in hiding behind the notorious myth about the "tank threat from the East," has focused the attention of its readers on the supposed compelled defensive nature of the work carried out. In actuality, this fabrication is based upon the desire of the aggressive NATO circles to achieve significant military-technical superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries making it possible for them [the NATO powers] to carry out active offensive operations.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON WESTERN IMPROVEMENTS IN TANK FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS

Moscow ZAKHARCHENKOYE VOYENNOYE INZHENIYERNOYE UCHILISHCHE NO. 11, Dec 82 (to appear in press in SVV 83) pp 26-30

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Eng.-Lt Col V. Averetich-Mich.
"Improvement in Tank Fire Control Systems"]

[Text] The militaristic circles of the leading NATO countries in a future war are planning to widely use tanks. Because of this, great attention is given to increasing the effectiveness of their weapons and significant amounts of money are being spent on this. As has been pointed out in the foreign press, one of the ways for carrying out the given task is to equip the tanks with a modern fire control system (FCS). Much work is being done in modernizing the existing tank fleet, in producing modern tanks and in developing future models. In the opinion of foreign specialists, the basic tasks of the FCS are the following: ensuring observation and detection of the target, aiming and effective firing from a halt and in motion against mobile and stationary objects; a substantial shortening of the time from the moment of target identification and taking the decision to hit to the setting off of the round; ensuring acceptable values for the kill probability in firing in motion at mobile ground objects.

The development of the FCS in foreign nations has been carried out in various ways. For U.S. tank divisions, there has been a characteristic path of development where: the performance of the individual units, assemblies and systems was successively improved. Since 1971, American specialists have been carrying out research and development on future models of armored equipment within the new ACTV (Armored Combat Vehicle Technology) Program. One of the aims of the program has been to assess the work for increasing and determining the fire capabilities of the tank and achieving realistic FCS performance. It has been assumed that as a result of this work, information will be obtained which can be used in developing new individual assemblies of future armored vehicles. The experimental calculation research has been carried out on the dependence of the kill probability upon the target speed in firing from tanks moving in motion and guided by missiles. The employed measuring equipment has made it possible to determine the target coordinates, the aiming accuracy in simulating firing and to determine the amount of the missed and know the reasons causing them.

In the course of the research, the development of a vehicle model was developed for an experimental investigation of the armored vehicle, called ATMO (Armored Test Model). This was to be equipped with an experimental FCS the structure and

parameters of which could be altered in sufficiently broad limits to choose a rational version for the specific task and mission. On a competitive basis, a version of the system developed by the Delco Electronics firm was adopted. It includes an optical sight with independent field of vision stabilization in two fields, an electronic ballistic computer with a set of automatic firing condition sensors, a laser range finder and an automatic target tracking device. The latter is to be used in firing while in motion at moving targets.

The designated gun FCS is calculated to work under various modes. For example, the automatic target tracking device and a number of other assemblies can fail while the sight can be converted to a fixed coupling with the cannon.

The manufacturing of the HIMAG mock-up was completed at the end of 1977 and then, it was turned over for testing at the Fort Knox Testing Range. As was pointed out in the foreign press, in preparing to test the mock-up, particular attention was given to the quality of the metering equipment for precisely determining the current coordinates of the mock-up and target on the test run.

A high-frequency range finder system and an automatic TV device were employed for tracking the mock-up and target. The role of firers was performed by simulators of the assistant guided missile complexes and cameras mounted in the guns. Various metering equipment and sensors were located directly on the mock-up and information from these was transmitted to the data processing center over IIG channels and recorded on the magnetic tape of the memory unit. During the first stage of testing, around 1.75 million film frames were taken and their processing required almost a year. In the course of the second stage they also planned to investigate different variations of the systems.

Following from the information in the foreign press, the approach of the FCS for modern guns is to be carried out in the following areas: an introduction into mass-produced systems for preparing and inputting the initial firing data considering the change in location of external conditions; increasing the performance, range and speed of stabilization of the individual elements of the system including high-resolution sensors, modular design and multi-channel monitoring units; ensuring automatic target tracking using optical and radar automatic tracking systems.

The final modern concept of a ballistic FCS represented by systems, the architecture of which is determined by the needs of the gun, is a task which is to be solved in the course of the development of the Agony, the NATO plan. On the American side, the main focus is on the development of the gun and the gunner's sight. The development of the gunner and the machine gun sight of the commander, a two-plane gun stabilized with an electrohydraulic drive, the electronic ballistic computer for the control board and panels. The gun commander has a sight mounted on the gun's weapon. For firing under conditions of motion, the sight has a laser range finder sight, an automatic self-stabilizing sight, a sight with motion board. The gun's sight has independent fields of vision, horizontal and vertical, and the vertical field of vision is also independent of the vertical plane and roll. It has a device of American design which makes sufficiently stable measurements of range and speed of the movement of the target. In the same unit with this there is a TV camera device for the target's laser range finder, a self-stabilizing sight, a sight with motion board.

As the foreign specialists feel, the most complex assembly in the FLT-2 system is the gunner's range finder sight, a particular feature of which is the stabilizing in two planes for the field of vision of the optical sight channel and the co-aligned laser range finder and the absence of a rigid line with the cannon. According to statements in the foreign press, the possible values for the standard deviations of stabilization in both planes are not more than 0.15-0.2 thousandths. Such accuracy performance is achieved by the fact that integrating gyroscopes are employed as sensitive elements for determining the angular deflections of the unified head mirror (in a gimbal mount) from the set position.

The laser range finder employs neodymium-activated yttrium-aluminum garnet (operating wave length of 1.06 microns). It makes it possible with an accuracy of ± 10 m to simultaneously measure the ranges to two targets which are within its beam up to a distance of 4,000 m. The laser range finder transceiver is located directly in the housing of the gunner's sight. According to an announcement of the developers, for nighttime operations the design of the gunner's sight provides for the installing of a TV channel module. To complete the development of this channel a low level KIB-200 television system with a range of 1,000 m is being installed on the serially produced tanks. The transmitting camera for this system is mounted on the cannon's screen and the video monitors at the gunner's and commander's seats.

In carrying out a direct task, the gunner, in viewing the target through the RME-17 sight, with the aid of the control board adjusts the aim, measures the distance to the target using the laser range finder and makes the shot. The shot signal is controlled by an electronic check system and is tripped in the event of a firing error (within the limits of the set tolerances) for the position and aiming rate of the gun (considering the elevation and lead angle) and the sight's line of sight in both aiming planes. In the two-plane stabilizer, the deflection of the sight is determined from the sensor signals in the gyro with updates to it and gun. Such a system, in the opinion of West German specialists, provides the possibility of firing in a stabilized mode with the aid of the gunner's auxiliary sight with the failure of the field of vision stabilizer systems of the gunner's main sight and the commander's sight.

In the aimed process, the signals from the sensors for the position of the line of sight and the gun gun unit go to the computer which generates the elevation and lead considering the data on the external conditions (put in automatically or manually), the range to the target and the rate of the reciprocal movement of the tank and target. Then the values of these angles go for processing directly to the drives for aiming the weapon in the vertical and horizontal planes. This maintains the position of the aiming mark for the targets and makes it possible to have fast range measurements.

For the aimed firing of the Obiekt 221 tank the RME and Obiekt 221 developed a laser range finder sight with according to a television system with individual channels for the laser emitter and photoreceiver. This is based upon an improved model for a gunner's sight with a multi-line transceiver of the laser range finder. This can be controlled both by the gunner and the commander. The range finder sight is equipped with a device for reducing the probability of a false guide movement to the target. The mark used for aiming is a

adjusting ellipse the dimensions of which change automatically in proportionally to the value of the measured range which is shown in the right-hand eyepiece of the range finder sight and in the commander's display. A visual comparison of the size of the ellipse and the target makes it possible for the gunner to quickly judge the reliability of the value of the measured range.

In France, the M6-372 tank uses the GDFC computer in its automatic fire control system. It employs independent stabilization of the field of vision in the commander's sight. The position of the aiming line remains visually unchanged when it moves. He knows "where" in the horizon is leading the allocated elevation and lateral lead as well as with the effect of external disturbances. Such a system, in the opinion of several specialists, significantly facilitates target tracking and aiming. The PC's core includes laser range finder and an electronic ballistic computer.

In the opinion of industry specialists, as a rule it is advisable to pay
wages with a factor of 1.05 to 1.08, as this makes it possible to better
adapt conditions of labor, wages, rate, work and rest of night. In 1981
from the labor payment an opportunity to identify the targets according
to the "incentive" principle. Such a factor should have a small value
low responsibility. It also be necessary to invest organization in terms
the last 2 years.

As has been stated in the foreign press, using the given radar it is possible not only to detect a target, but also when necessary to conduct aimed firing from the cannon and the coupled machine gun. The radar employs a specific matrix indicator with optoelectric elements which show the target's location in the antenna scanned area. It shows the return from the target, and there is a device for the visual assessment of its magnified image. From the different audio tone it is possible to identify wheeled and tracked vehicles, a single man or a group of personnel. In pressing a button on the instrument's scale which has digital displays, the target coordinates are depicted in terms of range and direction. The radar also includes equipment for "friend-foe" identification.

The foreign press has pointed out that the improvement of radars employed for ground reconnaissance is to be carried out, in particular, in the following areas: the development of light and dependable close-action radars, the accuracy of target coordinate determination in which provides the possibility of carrying out effective aimed fire from the gun; the development of specialized radars for detecting stationary targets concealed by vegetation; control of tank cannon fire. The United States is developing promising radar models which will employ shorter wave lengths including the millimeter band. In the assessment of American specialists, the creation of radars employing such a wave band makes it possible to obtain small-sized antennas and other component elements of the radar, high resolution and resistance to interference by the narrow beam of the antenna directional pattern as well as a visual target image as a consequence of the rapid scanning and the employment of optoelectric conversion methods.

Foreign specialists are paying definite attention to the study and accumulation of target radar signatures, that is, the specific changes in the various parameters of the returned signal (Doppler frequency, amplitude, phase, energy and frequency distributions of the harmonic components and so forth) caused by the characteristic features of various targets, for example, by the presence of 1 or 2 main masses of metal, moving parts and the ability to reflect the radar signal. Information on the signatures of typical targets stored in the memory of a small electronic computer and the signatures of real targets detected during active or passive correlation methods and this provides an opportunity to automatically corroborate the analyses of detecting and isolating real targets and the accuracy of their coordinates. Similar work is also being done to increase the target resistance to interference under the conditions of both natural and artificial interference. This task is being carried out by using the method of internal signal coherence, pseudorandom modulation and the static processing of the received signal in the receiver. The sharp increase in the operational reliability of the radars and the reduction of their size and weight features as well as increased power are basically achieved by using microelectronic elements, new designed instruments and highly efficient power sources.

RAYKIN, "Soviet Ground Reconnaissance Radar", 1981

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON NEUTRON WEAPONS

Moscow. ZARUBCHENOV (ZARUBCHENOV OBRUCHENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82) signed 70 press in Dec 82 p. 40-44.

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Senior Col (RMA) G. I. Iosad: "Neutron Weapons".]

[Text: Regardless of the protests by the world community, the U.S. Administration has adopted a decision to produce neutron ammunition. This barbaric means for the mass destruction of human beings. In the first stage they plan to manufacture 7,180 warheads (for 380 Lance guided missiles and 800 shells of VP3.7-mm caliber). Also in the stage of development is a 100-mm neutron shell. Data on the American delivery systems for neutron weapons are given in Table 1.

Table 1

Basic Characteristics of American Delivery Systems for Neutron Weapons

| Characteristic | 203,2-mm M109A1 Howitzer | Lance 300mm Guided Missile |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Nuclear Ammunition | 80% warhead of VP3.7 shell | 80% warhead |
| TNT equivalent, kilograms | 1 | 10 |
| Range, km | 14.4 | 120 |
| Time for reaching target after launch, minutes | 3 | 10 |
| Time delay for det. explosion, seconds (approximate, minutes) | 10 | 10 |
| Accuracy in hitting at a range of 20 km, meters | 140 | 10 |
| Accuracy in hitting at a range of 20 km, meters | 30 | 10 |

8 in. (203.2 mm) M109A1 (VP3.7 shell) - 14.4 km

judging from statements in the foreign press, American tactical nuclear weapons with an increased yield of initial radiation, or so-called neutron radiation, are low-yield thermonuclear ammunition. The charge of nuclear ammunition, in addition to the atomic igniter which is supplied with fissionable materials, includes a certain number of heavy hydrogen isotopes: tritium and deuterium. With the detonating of the atomic igniter, high pressure and temperature are developed and this creates conditions necessary for the occurrence of thermonuclear reactions for the fusion of the tritium and deuterium nuclei. The basic share of energy released in the course of the reaction is transferred to the neutrons which spread outwards in the form of lethal radiation.

It has been pointed out that in detonating a 1-kiloton neutron shell, at least 50 percent of the released energy goes into the fission reactions and for this reason, in relation to the impact of the air shock wave it will behave at least like a classic nuclear weapon with a power of 0.5 kilotons. But in accord with the physical laws of similarity, this means that the destructive radius of the shock wave is reduced not by 2-fold, but rather very insignificantly by 1.25. Moreover, it must also be considered that a portion of the energy from the explosion of the thermonuclear charge goes to form the shock wave and for this reason the destructive radius of the shock wave in detonating a neutron weapon will be very close to the effective radius of the shock wave in detonating a classic nuclear shell of the same power. Consequently, the "neutronness" of a 100-ton neutron shell, by the way, fired by a cruise missile does not lead to a substantial reduction in the blast damage effect, as the American propaganda media have stated.

Obviously they believe the fact that in detonating a neutron shell, as a consequence of the energy transfer flow in a certain area around the detonator there will occur lethal radiation and with the ground-level detonation of such a weapon will destroy or injure leading to the contamination of the terrain. Deliberately, in the foreign military press are views encountered which more realistically reflect the nature of the destructive action of neutron weapons. The American journal MILITARY REVIEW published the following data on the destructive action of a 1-kiloton neutron weapon with an effective yield of 0.5 kilotons:

| Weapon type | Approximate dimensions | Distance from epicenter, m |
|--|------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Air-ground, sea and land (air, sea, land) | | |
| 2. Air | | 700 |
| 3. Land | | 400 |
| 4. Sea | | 1000 |
| Radius of 0.5 kiloton (conventional) shell | | 700-800 |
| 5. Air-ground, sea and land (air, sea, land) | | |
| 6. Air | | 150 |
| 7. Land | | 100 |
| 8. Sea | | 100 |
| 9. Air-ground, sea and land (air, sea, land) | | 100 |
| 10. Air | | 100 |
| 11. Land | | 100 |
| 12. Sea | | 100 |

The nature of the change of the induced radiation in the ground after the explosion of the given neutron weapon is shown in Fig. 1. In crossing a zone of induced radiation (moving across the diameter of the zone for 1 hour) immediately after the explosion the personnel would receive a dose on the order of 5 rad. But even such a low radiation from the military viewpoint can tell negatively in the future on the health of the men. Moreover, in a number of instances (as a consequence of injuries or because of blockages) many will be forced to remain in a zone of induced radiation and will sustain substantially higher doses.



Fig. 1. Size of dose caused by induced radiation in the ground: 1--20 minutes after explosion; 2--1 hour after explosion; a--Size of dose, rad per hour; b--Distance from explosion epicenter, m.

As for the nature of injuries in the detonating of neutron weapons, let us turn to the estimates given by specialists from the Nuclear Weapons Agency of the U.S. Defense Department (Fig. 2). These have been made by extrapolating data on the consequences of the American use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as the results obtained in laboratory experiments and during nuclear weapons testing. According to these estimates, in sustaining a dose:

- 1) Of over 8,000 rad, people will immediately be incapacitated and death will occur in several hours and often immediately after irradiating;
- 2) 3,000-8,000 rad, the victims are incapacitated in several minutes and then 30-50 minutes later for some period they acquire a certain, although reduced capacity for action, but everyone perishes within the month;
- 3) 450-2,000 rad, during the first hours after irradiating the organism of the victims continues to function normally, but then over a period of several weeks almost 100 percent of the victims dies as a consequence of radiation sickness;
- 4) 200-450 rad, the picture of morbidity is the same as in the previous instance, but there is a certain percentage of survival;
- 5) Under 100 rad, the percentage of survivors exceeds 50 percent, however, as with the higher doses, there is a loss of hair, hemorrhaging, nausea, pains in the throat are felt and there is a sharp rise in the probability of subsequently coming down with various forms of cancer;
- 6) Under 10 rad, external symptoms of injury to the inner organs are not apparent. At the same time, in the foreign press it has been emphasized that neutron radiation even in small doses represents a danger for leukemia.

Previously foreign specialists assumed that with a dose of 450 rad, the mortality would be around 50 percent of the afflicted. However, from data given by the Swedish scientist Baja, it is possible to conclude that in the absence of




Fig. 2. Injurious effect of neutron radiation on humans

- a--Dose, rad
- b--Complete incapacitation
- c--Death
- d--Incapacitation for a certain time
- e--Weakening of functional capacity
- f--Maintaining of functional capacities
- g--Possibility of fatality
- h--Time after explosion



Fig. 3. Doses of neutron radiation at various distances from explosion epicenter

- 1--Classic nuclear 1 kiloton weapon
- 2--Classic nuclear 10-kiloton weapon
- 3--1 kiloton neutron weapon
- a--Dose of neutron radiation, rad
- b--Distance from explosion epicenter, m

medical treatment, such mortality can occur even with doses of 100-160 rad and with intensive treatment at 170-250 rad. It is emphasized that treatment would be effective only with relatively low doses.

It is also essential to bear in mind that in a number of instances, even if the radiation dose does not cause the immediate death of the victims, their organism, weakened by radiation sickness, loses the ability to resist infectious diseases. This factor, as well as the difficulties in terms of food, water supply, the removal of the dead and so forth, will contribute to the development of mass epidemics with numerous fatalities.

It is essential to add that because of the designated particular features of the course and outcome of radiation sickness arising as a consequence of the detonating of neutron weapons, a complex problem arises related to the presence of a significant number of persons who are seriously afflicted by radiation who in the Western press have been called the "walking dead." This refers to people who are still alive and are performing certain functions, but realize that they will die in a short period of time. Up to now such a problem has not existed in the practice of wars. What thicknesses of protective materials are needed so that the people in the shelters would not sustain significant radiation doses in detonating a neutron weapon? From the graph published in the

magazine INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW (Fig. 3). It follows that, for example, at a distance of 1,000 m from the explosion epicenter of a neutron weapon with a power of 1 kiloton, the dose will be several thousand rad. For this reason, in order that the dose received by persons in shelters be harmless, that is, under 10 rad, the dose must be attenuated by approximately 1,000 times. On the basis of the data in Table 2 given in the mentioned publication and describing the protective properties of materials, we can see that such attenuation would be provided by a layer of concrete (with a high iron content) approximately 1 m thick or by a layer of moist dirt greater than 1.5 m. In the event of using a classic nuclear weapon of the same power, under analogous conditions for ensuring human safety, it would be sufficient to have a concrete or dirt layer, respectively, 25 or 40 cm thick.

Table 2

Attenuation Factors for Neutron Flow by Various Materials
(at a distance of 1,000 m from epicenter of neutron weapon explosion)

| Materials | Thickness, cm | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------|----|-------|-----|--------|
| | 40 | 50 | 100 | 120 | 200 |
| Water | 12.8 | | | 172 | 1,407 |
| Dry ground | 8.52 | | | 382 | 8,324 |
| Wet ground | 13.5 | | | 754 | 18,725 |
| Ordinary concrete | | 22 | 603 | | |
| Concrete with boron additive | | 43 | 1,765 | | |
| Concrete with high iron content | | 29 | 1,076 | | |

The protecting of tank crews against neutron weapons has certain particular features and additional complications. Since the flow of fast neutrons is comparatively little weakened by the armor (at least 50 percent of the arriving neutrons passes through a layer 12 cm thick while armor 18 cm thick passes around 10 percent of them), in the opinion of American specialists, these weapons will be a particularly effective means for combating tanks. Moreover, the absorption of neutrons by the materials in the armor leads to the emission of gamma radiation which is lethal to the crew. For this reason a simple increase in armor thickness, as the Western experts feel, does virtually nothing to reduce the danger of radiation, leading at the same time to an unjustified increase in tank weight. They assume that in manufacturing armor for defense against neutrons, it will be necessary to have the comprehensive use of light and heavy materials. An example would be the armor of the new American M2 Bradley infantry combat vehicle, where between the steel sheets and aluminum hull they have laid polyurethane which is a hydrogen-containing plastic which is sufficiently strong and well compatible with steel.

Foreign specialists have voiced the view that one neutron weapon of 1 kiloton power in terms of the effect on tanks or protected personnel is 60-90-fold more effective than a volley of divisional weapons and the equal to the destructive action of 600-800 tons of conventional ammunition. However, here it is emphasized that a number of conditions must be met to achieve the given effectiveness.

In particular, the strikes by neutron weapons should basically be made against areal targets, for example, against a battalion.

The use of such weapons should be supported and ensured by the use of other weapons the effect of which (the creation of minefields, the destruction of crossings, the felling of timber and so forth) can lead to enemy troop concentrations which are advantageous targets for neutron weapon strikes. It is also essential to carry out early and careful preparations, in particular, to select the firing positions for the neutron weapon delivery systems and the epicenters of the future explosions.

Particular attention is paid to creating a network of observation posts linked by radio and telephone directly to the artillery positions. The task of these posts includes the prompt giving of the signal to open fire. The problem is, as American specialists feel, in accord with the law of dispersion, 90 percent of the shells fired from the 203.2-mm howitzers will fall in a circle with a radius of 260 m, that is, the firing accuracy will not essentially influence the nature of target kill as long as the target remains stationary near the planned explosion epicenter. If it is considered that the speed of a tank column under combat conditions is on the order of 20-30 km per hour in daylight and 15-20 km per hour at night, while the shells time of flight is around 1 minute, the center of the target in just this minute will be moved by 350-500 m under daylight conditions and each additional second of delay in opening fire will add approximately 7 m to this distance. Consequently, hitting such a mobile target as a battalion of tanks or motorized infantry can be successful only under the condition of careful observation of the enemy's approach to the designated lines, the immediate reporting of these data to the gun crews and the rapid response of the latter to the observer reports.

It is also pointed out that increased firing accuracy against moving targets can be achieved by equipping the neutron weapon with a laser homing head. Here the target is to be illuminated by the forward observers. In truth, such a method can be ineffective under the conditions of rain, snowfall, great dustiness or smokiness of the air. Due to the importance which is attached to observing the targets on the level of the subsequent employment of neutron weapons against them, certain American specialists have come out for using remote controlled sensors for warning of the appearance of tanks in those areas where the vision conditions are complex.

Certain Western military specialists, in examining the questions of ensuring the effectiveness of combat operations by the tank and mechanized troops under the conditions of employing neutron weapons, have placed the greatest accent on improving the tactics of their employment. Thus, it has been proposed that the tanks be concentrated only in the initial stage of breaking through the enemy defenses. Here for protecting a stationary tank it might be possible to utilize "jackets" from hydrogen-containing materials. In their opinion, one must not overlook the possibility of locating the tanks along the bottom of rivers as in this instance they will be sufficiently securely protected by the layer of water against the neutrons.

In committing the tanks to combat, it has been recommended that they be spread out as much as possible in order to reduce losses in the detonating of a neutron

weapon. In the event of the complete incapacitation of the tank crews, the possibility must be provided for their rapid replacement on the battlefield (for example, the delivering of new crews by helicopter) in the aim of continuing the use of the battleworthy equipment.

The Soviet Union was the first to draw the attention of peoples to the danger arising out of the appearance of neutron weapons, this means of mass destruction. Their development is not only a step on the path to unleashing a new war, but also a challenge to all the peace-loving forces of our world. The rulers of the Pentagon are well aware that the development of such weapons is a new criminal action from the viewpoint of international law, since in terms of the nature of their destructive action, they to a definite degree are similar to chemical and biological weapons. Even in 1978, the USSR and the other socialist countries which were members of the UN Disarmament Committee submitted a draft convention on banning neutron weapons for its review.

Throughout the world there has been a broad response to the words from the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress that the USSR will not start the production of neutron weapons if they do not appear in other states and is ready to conclude an agreement which bans them forever.

However, the United States and its closest NATO allies, in ignoring the will of the world community, has stalemated the talks on this important problem. Here it would be wise to quote the words addressed to the American leadership by the former Presidential Adviser for Science George Kistiakowsky, a person rather competent on nuclear weapons questions, who stated: "If you use the neutron bomb against the USSR, the Russians will certainly strike back with everything they have, namely with full-scale nuclear weapons." This is the warning to the U.S. Administration from certain far-sighted Americans.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON NATO UDT RECONNAISSANCE, DIVERSIONARY ACTIONS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 16 Dec 82) pp 73-78

[Article by Capt 2d Rank (Res) V. Mosalev: "Principles in the Employment of Underwater Reconnaissance and Diversionary Subunits"]

[Text] In the aggressive plans of the NATO Naval Command, a prominent place has been given to the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits to which, as is emphasized in the foreign press, it has entrusted the conducting of reconnaissance and diversionary actions in naval bases, ports, base and dispersion points, in roadsteads, anchorages and in the enemy's coastal regions. Their tasks include the destruction of large surface vessels and submarines, shore missile complexes, bridges, dams, drydocks, hydraulic engineering works, transport arteries, pipelines, overhead communications lines, various dumps and other military and industrial objects. In addition, they should conduct reconnaissance in coastal waters and on shore (in the interests of conducting naval landing operations), destroy antilanding obstacles and natural obstacles in the areas of the planned landing, prepare areas of the coast for the approach of the landing craft and landing pads for helicopters as well as support the landing and removal of agent groups from the enemy coast and combat enemy underwater reconnaissance and diversionary groups.

In the foreign press it has been pointed out that underwater diversionary actions in their modern understanding were first employed in the course of World War I, when the Austrian battleship "Viribus Untis" was blown up in the naval base of Pula.

During the years of World War II, frogmen (this is the name given in the West to the personnel of the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits) were already widely employed initially in the Italian and Japanese navies and later on by Great Britain, Germany, the United States, France and Norway. They conducted more than 60 operations in the course of which around 20 combat ships were sunk and damaged, including 5 ships of the line and 3 cruisers. In addition, approximately 60 vessels with a total tonnage of over 490,000 tons were destroyed. In the Normandy Landing, American frogmen reconnoitered and destroyed antilanding obstacles and deactivated more than 200 mines.

Since World War II, the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits have been rather widely involved in the U.S. aggression in Korea and Vietnam

as well as in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. At the peak of combat operations in Vietnam, in 1965 alone, the United States had trained 3,000 frogmen of which 800 took a direct part in combat.

As was pointed out in the foreign press, the experience of utilizing the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits in World War II and in the post-war period showed their high effectiveness and contributed to their further development. At present, virtually all the basic NATO countries have comparatively small, but well-equipped and well-trained frogmen subunits as part of their navies. These are constantly involved in the numerous national and NATO exercises in the course of which particular attention has been paid to the tactics of their employment.

The delivery of the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary groups to the enemy coast and rear can be carried out by underwater, surface and air carriers. As underwater carriers it is possible to use both the special small and super-small [pygmy] submarines as well as nuclear and conventional diesel ones. The former have docking chambers for the submerged release and receiving of 8-12 frogmen while the latter are capable of releasing and receiving them through the torpedo tubes or the air-lock chambers. The small and super-small subs can also transport underwater propulsion devices (UPD), limpet mines and charges, special underwater containers and small torpedoes. The super-small subs can be delivered to the area of combat employment on nuclear and diesel subs, on amphibious dock ships and on specially equipped carrier vessels.

The American press has stated that certain nuclear subs of the U.S. and Royal navies have been equipped to transport deepwater salvage and rescue vehicles (of the DSRV type) on the deck and for releasing and receiving them under water. These can also carry the super-small submarines. At present, virtually any submarine is capable of transporting one or two UPD on the deck. The former missile sub "Grayback" will be in service in the U.S. Navy until 1986 and in the bow of this submarine there are two air-lock chambers and each of these can carry two 4-man UPD which are released and recovered in a submerged position while underway. In addition, it can carry 67 frogmen.*

The launching of the frogmen from the sub can be done at slow speed or when the sub is resting on the bottom. In being released while underway, a special buoy is released to the surface and it is connected to the sub by a towing and guiding cable. In holding onto it, the frogmen float to the surface and are towed behind the buoy on short lanyards until the entire group surfaces or until an inflatable raft surfaces. The frogmen are released from a submarine lying on the bottom at depths of 20-30 m with the proper bottom relief and hardness. In leaving the sub, the frogmen remove underwater towing vehicles and cargo containers from the torpedo tubes, they remove the fastenings of the UPD and make them ready.

* For more detail on the underwater delivery devices for frogmen see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 3, 1979, pp 71-72.--Editors.

The frogmen move toward the shore under water using flippers (the sub may land the men up to 5 miles away from the shore and here the speed of the swimmer is 0.6-0.9 knots) and underwater towing devices (a distance of around 15 miles, while the speed of the towing devices does not exceed 2-4 knots, since the frogmen are astride, lying down or behind them and are not protected against the oncoming flow of water). The UPD are employed in landings at comparatively great distances from the shore and the frogmen are located inside the hull and are protected from the oncoming flow of water. The wet type UPD make it possible to transport 1-4 men over a distance of 8-50 miles (at a speed up to 8 knots), while the wet type UPD can carry up to 5 men a distance of 150 miles (15 knots).

In approaching the shore, the frogmen unload under water their rubberized bags with tools from the cargo containers. Then the containers and the UPD or towing devices are secured to the bottom and if possible camouflaged. If they are still needed then sonar buoys which turn on at a designated time or upon command are attached to them (for facilitating retrieval). Further movement to the shore is carried out using fins. The diving gear can also be left under the water and in this instance the frogmen move toward shore under water using their snorkels and if the situation permits, on the surface.

With surface delivery and landing, combat and landing vessels, auxiliary vessels, special high-speed launches, air-cushion boats, inflatable life rafts with low-noise outboard motors (the motors can be submerged for an extended time), semisubmersible and surface tugs, special canoes and boats can also be employed.

A surface landing is carried out from special high-speed launches which can travel at a speed of 40-50 knots and have a range of 150 miles and more and are capable of transporting 10-20 men. The landing from them is done at speeds up to 35 knots and here the launches ordinarily do not come any closer than 5.5 miles from the shore. If the frogmen do not employ propulsive equipment, they use their fins pushing a watertight bag in front of them and dive under the surface only when they are approaching the object to be attacked or the landing area on shore at a distance which would allow them to be seen or with the danger of detection. Having reached dry land, the frogmen in a convenient area remove the weapons and gear from the bags, they change into the necessary clothing and hide the bags on the shore or fasten them underwater on the bottom and conceal them. If they have traveled using an inflatable boat then the air is let out of it and it is also concealed.

The air landing of frogmen is carried out by special aircraft and helicopters. In the first instance the landing is made by parachutes onto the water or land from low altitudes (120 m during the day and 200 m at night) or from medium altitudes (6,000 m) with the delayed opening of the parachute. Parachutes are employed with a wind velocity up to 15 m per second at the water's surface and 9 m per second at the ground's surface (the speed of the aircraft is around 250 km per hour).

In using gliding parachutes it is possible to make a land and water landing up to 11-16 km away from the drop point and this makes it possible for the carrier airplane to remain a safe distance off shore and makes it difficult for the

enemy to determine the landing area and sometimes even the very target of the aircraft's flight.

A group can be landed from a helicopter without its landing either on parachutes from an altitude of 200-350 m or without them on the water at a height of 5-6 m (with the helicopter flying at a speed up to 35 km per hour) as well as on land using a 45-m cable.

With an air landing, it is possible to drop simultaneously the underwater towing devices, inflatable boats and cargo containers.

The foreign military press has described the following procedure for frogman operations in carrying out the tasks assigned to them.

In supporting landing operations, the frogmen are delivered to the area of the forthcoming landing 3 or 4 days prior to its start. In being dropped from launches the U.S. Navy employs the following methods: the "standard" and "Fulton." In the first instance, the launch, with an inflatable boat fastened to the side away from the shore and which contains the frogmen (Fig. 1) [photographs not reproduced], travels at a speed of 15 knots along the shoreline at a distance of 450 m away or along the 9-m isobath. The frogmen in pairs or individually jump into the water every 23 m. The second method is used with the launch traveling up to a speed of 35 knots. The frogmen leave the boat one after another, assuming a horizontal position on their back by the moment of entering the water and absorbing the inertia, pressing their chin against their chest and their arms against their body.

After dropping, the frogmen upon the command of the leader, begin moving to the shore in searching for antilanding obstacles and barriers at depths of 6-0.3 m and recording the results on special tablets which glow in the dark. Having reached the water's edge, they shift 12 m to the left and continue an analogous search from the shore seawards. At night, for supporting their actions, the group commander and one of the frogmen come out on shore. The former, using a multicolored flashlight with a directed beam, directs the actions of the frogmen searching for the obstacles while the latter protects the shore along the perimeter of the area being reconnoitered. With poor visibility and at night, for locating underwater obstacles, it is possible to use underwater goggles, night vision instruments and small-sized manual GAS [sonar device], and for communications inside the group, small underwater communications sets and ultra-shortwave radios. Having completed the reconnaissance, the frogmen swim out to sea where they are picked up by the launch, helicopter or submarine.

On the day of the landing, with the start of the artillery and air softening-up, high-speed launches, in moving along the reconnoitered first line of underwater antilanding obstacles, under the cover of smokescreens, land demolition divers who fasten limpet charges on the underwater obstacles and as the first wave of landing forces begins moving to the shore, these are detonated simultaneously. The remaining obstacles are marked with buoys while the passages through the obstacles are indicated by specially assigned demolition divers, smoke or light markers.

In the sabotaging of ships, hydraulic engineering works and other objects located in water, the frogmen endeavor to come close to them, drifting with the current in order not to leave any trace through the water. Particular care is observed in placing mines on the shafts, props and rudders of ships as it is very dangerous to come near intakes. Special limpet mines and explosive charges (these can be nuclear) are used for blowing up ships. Small (weighing 10-15 kg) and medium (30-50 kg) mines are fastened to the objects to be sabotaged by magnets, rubber suction cups or clamps while large mines (up to 230 kg) and charges (275 kg) are placed beneath them on the bottom. These all have static, dynamic and combined delayed-action fuzes from 20 minutes to several hours and days and are also equipped with mechanical, hydrostatic, induction and other antideactivation devices which explode in attempts to remove them. Special shaped charges are used to sever chains, lines and cables.

In conducting sabotage on shore, initially two scouts are landed and they reconnoiter the shoreline, select the place for the landing of the demolition men, give the signal for the landing and lead them to the object of the sabotage. After placing the charges, the demolition men return to the boat while the scouts prime the delayed action fuzes or light the safety fuze and quickly return to the shore. The time of the explosion is usually set for the estimated moment that the entire group will be assembled. Its actions are directed by the operation's leader who does not land on the shore.

The frogmen are armed with pneumatic pistols with optical sights adopted for firing under water and on the surface, with submachine guns, grenade launchers and missiles (including underwater), fragmentation, incendiary and chemical grenades. For blowing up antilanding obstacles and shore installations, limpet mines are employed as well as general standard demolition slabs, satchel charges, shaped charges, strip charges and booby traps.

For nighttime operations, the saboteurs have night vision glasses, binoculars and instruments. Radio contact within the group is provided by individual ultra-shortwave radios and shortwave radios are employed for communication with the command.

The picking up of the reconnaissance and diversionary groups can be carried out by underwater, surface and air methods. In the first instance the frogmen locate and put on their underwater gear, ready the towing devices and UPD and then travel to the previously designated area where the submarine is waiting for them. The return to the sub resting on the bottom is carried out using the sub's sonar homing beacon which is activated upon the signal of the frogmen or at a specially designated time and communication with it is maintained by the underwater communications set.

With surface pick-up, the divers inflate the boat and swimming with the aid of a surface towing device set to sea where they turn on the ultra-shortwave homing beacon for leading the forces assigned for the pick-up to them.

Frogman groups which have conducted the search for antilanding obstacles in the water are usually picked up from the water's surface by launches underway in the following two methods. In picking up by the first method, the launch with

an inflated raft by its side at a speed of 15 knots travels alongside the frogmen which have spaced themselves out in a line 23 m apart.

With the approach of the launch, they raise themselves as high as possible out of the water, bending their left arm in a hook while the lifter in the boat places a leather loop ("noose") over it. Feeling the loop on his arm, the diver grabs his left wrist in his right hand. He is then pulled out of the water and into the inflated boat, he removes the loop and moves to the launch while the lifter pulls out the next man. With the second method, the frogmen are divided into two equal groups (90 m apart). Traveling at a speed up to 35 knots, the launch, in passing each of them, drops the divers fiberglass "aquaplanes" connected by a nylon cable. The divers pull the aquaplanes away from one another until the connecting cable appears on the surface, they turn facing each other, climb onto the aquaplanes and remain there lying down and holding on to the cable. The launch aims at the middle part of the cable connecting the aquaplanes, it seizes it with a special attachment and, in heading out to sea, draws the aquaplanes toward the stern. After this, the frogmen move to the launch.

An air pick-up is carried out by special aircraft and helicopters. Aircraft of the MCE-130E Hercules type have attachments for a non-landing lift known as the Midair Snatch system. Using this, it is possible to simultaneously pick up two men or 230 kg of freight from small areas on rugged terrain or from the surface of the water.

In picking up men from the surface of the water, the speed of flight of a helicopter is 35 km per hour and the altitude is up to 25 m. The helicopter with a lowered rope ladder (up to 30-60 cm above the water's surface) travels along the divers who have formed into a straight line and, having removed their fins, rapidly climb up the ladder (Fig. 2). If it is essential to pick up wounded and freight, a high-speed winch is used with a 100-m cable at the end of which various lifting devices are attached.

As has been emphasized in the foreign press, the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits of the NATO navies are manned by professionals who have mastered two or three military specialties. For constantly maintaining the personnel of these subunits in a high degree of combat readiness, exams and examination exercises are organized every 3-6 months. A frogman is considered ready for combat if he can swim with full gear 10 km on the surface in fins, towing 50 kg of equipment, 900 m under water in an aqualung and 450 m maintaining a set course by compass during the day and at night, 40 km on a UPD as well as make a forced march of 28-30 km with a load of 23-34 kg. Each quarter he should make at least one parachute jump.

Proceeding from the experience of numerous exercises, the specialists from the NATO navies feel that the underwater reconnaissance and diversionary subunits can be employed with the greatest effectiveness primarily in amphibious landing operations as well as in local and limited wars in organizing the struggle against the national liberation movement together with other special forces.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 74. The dropping of frogmen by the "standard" method.
2. p 76. Lifting frogmen onboard a helicopter.

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